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INTRODUCTION 
 
Nowadays more and more migrants choose European countries as their main destination. 
Eurostat data, in fact, shows a relentless upward trend of migration inflows since 2010.  
The recent financial crisis and the ageing of native population has enhanced the negative 
public attitudes toward foreigners. The widespread perception is that they represent an 
expenditure for the State Budget of a country: on the one hand they benefit more in public 
transfers, on the other they contribute less in taxes, further exacerbating the general 
government imbalance.  
 
The aim of the dissertation is to study whether and to what extent immigrants contribute in 
fiscal terms to the State Budget of the country they decide to settle in. 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 outlines the phenomenon at global, European and Italian level over the last decade 
using a demographic, economic and social perspective. More specifically, data about flows 
and stocks of immigrants are reported and the main countries of origin and destination are 
investigated. Moreover, a brief historical overview is presented starting from the discovery of 
Americas to the entry of Eastern countries in the EU.  
 
Chapter 2 is entirely dedicated to the analysis of the fiscal impact of migration in destination 
countries both at household and overall level. In particular we consider the average annual net 
contributions computed as the difference between General Government revenues and 
expenses. The study is conducted for Europe (i.e. comparisons among EU countries are 
performed), Italy and Lombardia region. We decided to focus on this region in order to get 
insights on which nationalities of immigrants affect positively or negatively the regional State 
Budget. 
 
Chapter 3 investigates to what extent the Italian pension system benefits from foreigners’ 
contributions. The reason why we analyze this aspect refers to the fact that social security 
contribution is the largest component of general government revenues paid by immigrants. 
Specifically, estimates about the number of native pensions (computed as total annual social 
security contributions paid by foreigners over the average per capita Italian pension income) 
8 
 
funded by immigrants are provided. Furthermore, projections about the future non-native 
retirement flows until 2025 are illustrated. 
Finally, to assess the long run sustainability of benefits exercised by foreigners on the Italian 
pension system we report results of the sensitivity analysis conducted by Ragioneria Generale 
dello Stato. 
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CHAPTER 1. MIGRATION FLOWS AND STOCKS. 
DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
1.1 Recent developments of migratory flows with a brief historical overview 
 
According to OECD estimates, in 2015 migration flows reached the highest share in 
Germany with 2 million of inflows and in US with 1 million. Unlike the previous year, these 
flows have suffered slight variations in many OECD countries, except for flows to certain 
European countries. In fact, although Germany is the country that hosts more immigrants 
since 2013, in 2015 it saw an increase of these flows of about 50% more than the previous 
year. Analyzing data by citizenship comes out that these flows are characterized by a variety 
of provenances. In fact whereas on one side there are immigrants from other EU countries that 
enjoy the freedom of movement such as Romania, Poland and Italy, on the other side we find 
migrants that come from those countries overrun by wars or other similar facts like Syria and 
Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 1.1. Top migration inflows in OECD countries 
 
Source: our elaborations on International Migration Database  
 
The arrival of migrants from these latter countries has given rise to a real refugee crisis that in 
2015 has had a dramatic deterioration, affecting as it has never done before, migration flows 
to some OECD countries. This probably justifies the increasing number of flows to Germany 
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which appears to be the first country that hosts refugees. Suffice to say that in 2014 there were 
65.000 new arrivals from Syria and that in 2015 the value has doubled. At this point is natural 
to ask what is the reason that drives these refugees to reach some countries like Germany, 
France, UK, Sweden rather than others. Although these reasons may differ from person to 
person, the main reasons appear to be of economic nature, namely that migrants move to 
countries where there are more job opportunities; the political
1
 ones, namely that migrants 
move to countries on which they can have more probabilities to obtain some form of political 
protection; or for those grounds concerning the family networks already settled in the arrival 
country. 
 
In 2015, according to UN’s available data2, the number of stock international migrants3 
worldwide reached about 244 million, equal to the 3.3% of the total population. Of these, 
based on UNHCR’s statistics, 65.3 million are forced migrants, i.e. those persons forced to 
migrate owing to persecutions, conflicts, violence and human rights violation. In particular, 
inside this category, it is possible to recognize three different status. The first is the refugees
4
 
status, which reached about 21.3 million in 2015, the second is asylum-seekers
5
status to 
which belong about 3.2 million of migrants and the third is IDPSs
6
 with about 40.8 million of 
individuals. In particular, as regards asylum-seekers, about 54% of them came mainly from 3 
countries: Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia
7
.  
 
From the geographical point of view, of the 244 million of international migrants, 104 million 
were born in Asia. Europe was the second largest origin continent with 62 million of 
migrants, followed by Latin America and Caribbean with 37 million, Africa with 34 million, 
North America with 4 million and Oceania with 2 million. At country level, India is the 
largest origin country with 16 million of individuals, followed by Mexico with 12 million, 
Russian Federation with 11 million, China with 10 million, Bangladesh with 7 million, 
Pakistan and Ukraine with 6 million. 
                                                          
1
 Not coincidentally Germany and Sweden seem to have granted the most of asylum requests in recent years. 
2
 The dataset presents estimates of international migrant by age, sex and origin. Estimates are available for all 
countries and areas of the world. The estimates are based on official statistics on the foreign-born or the foreign 
population. 
3
 person who changes his or her country of usual residence. 
4
 Individuals fled or expelled from their origin country owing to political, religious or racial discrimination, or a 
war, which are hosted in a foreign country which legally recognizes its status and protect it through political 
asylum. 
5
 Individuals seeking International protection in a foreign country, whose applications have not yet been 
accepted by destination country. 
6
 Internally Displaced Person: person forced for several reasons to leave his home to move towards other places, 
without crossing international borders. 
7
 Unlike what one thinks , they mainly go to Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Islamic Iran, Ethiopia and Jordan. 
13 
 
 
As regards the continents of destination, Europe hosts the greater quantity of international 
migrants with 76 million of them, followed by Asia with 75 million of individuals 
immigrated. The third largest host country is the North America with 54 million of migrants, 
followed by Africa with 21 million, Latin America and Caribbean with 9 million and at last 
Oceania with 8 million.  
Restricting the analysis at country level, is important to notice that in 2015, two thirds of all 
international migrants are living in just 20 countries (Figure 1.1). The largest number of 
international migrants live in the United States (47 million)
8
, followed by those that live in 
Germany (12 million
9
) and Russian Federation (12 million)
10
 and Saudi Arabia (10 million)
11
. 
 
 Figure 1.2.Countries of destination per stock of international migrants, 2015
 
Source: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
 
The largest international migration corridors are those characterized by movements within 
the same continent, as in the case of Asia-Asia routes with 59.4 million flows and Europe-
Europe routes with 39.9 millions of movements. Latin America and Caribbean-North America 
is the third largest corridor with 24.6 individual movements, followed by Asia-Europe (20.2 
                                                          
8
 Mainly from Mexico (12 million), China (2 million), India (1.9 million), Philippines (1.8 million). 
9
 Mainly from Poland (1.9 million), Turkey (1.6 million), Russian Federation (1 million). 
10
 Mainly from Ukraine (3.2 million), Kazakhstan (2.5 million) and Uzbekistan (1.1 million). 
11
 Mainly from India (1.8 million), Indonesia (1.2 million) and Pakistan (1.1 million). 
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million), Asia-North America (15.5 million), Africa-Africa (16.4 million) and Africa-Europe 
(9.9 million). 
Women constitute slightly less than half of all international migrants (48%), mainly from 
Africa and Asia where migrants are predominantly men, but women make up the majority of 
international migrants in Europe (52.4%) and North America (51.2%). 
In 2015 most of international migrants are in working age, in fact 177 million of them (72%) 
are between ages 20-64 , with the median age equal to 39 years old. Yet in some of major 
destination countries, the migration stock is becoming younger, as in the case of Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, and Oceania. 
 
As mentioned above, today United States are the main destination country of international 
migrants, but as will be seen below, they have had and maintained the primacy also in the past 
years in absolute terms, despite the different migratory dynamics. 
It is therefore interesting to retrace the history of migration flows, which in this paper is 
divided into seven historical periods. 
The first period covers the years from the discovery of the Americas to 1820. The discovery 
of the New World has in fact led to the launch of the transatlantic migration towards this 
continent, constitute for 82% of cases by African slaves, Europeans servants and convicts, and 
for 18% as free men.  
The second period covers the years beyond 1820 until the period before the outbreak of 
World War I. The improvement of communication system and the reduction of transport costs 
have meant that also less wealthy individuals and free men could move towards new horizons, 
launching from 40s the mass migration. During these years, 60 million of individuals came 
from Europe, whose migration rose from 300.000/year until the end of 70s for then reach the 
1 million/year during the last decade of ‘800. The main European origin countries were 
United Kingdom and Germany at first, but after also Scandinavia and Nord Europe, and only 
in the end of the century migrations also began from South and East European countries. 
Regarding the main destination countries even in the age of mass migration America resulted 
to be the main continent country, in particular towards the US, followed only in the last years 
of 800 of migration towards South America (Argentina, Brazil and Canada) and Australasia.  
The third period encloses the Two World Wars. The outbreak of the First World War, the 
subsequent Great Depression and the adoption of restrictive policies
12
 by US, have placed end 
to mass migrations from European countries, particularly of those from South and East 
Europe. 
                                                          
12
 I.e. literacy tests and annual quotas for foreigners. 
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The fourth period, which covers the Second postwar period until the early 70s, sees a new 
turning point in the migratory dynamics. In particular, although the main destinations 
countries started to recover shares of immigrants lost during the Wars and to remain the main 
countries of settlement, they never reached the Pre-War levels. This is probably due to the 
economic boom of 60s which transformed the West Europe from the main country of origin 
of migrants to main country of destination. This economic boom has in fact induced some 
European countries
13
 to open their labour markets to foreign
14
 manpower through active 
recruitment programs of so-called “guest-workers”, in order to offer a temporary response to 
the labour market needs. For this reason migration to European countries increased from 4 
million during 50s to 10 million in the 70s. But, in addition to the European dynamics, even in 
America the situation was slowly changing since Latin America was converting from 
immigration country to emigration country
15
. 
The fifth period covers the Oil Shock (1973), which caused a change of direction of migration 
flows from the geographical point of view. In fact this shock, with the economic recession and 
the adoption of restrictive policies
16
 by some European countries, reduced flows to North 
Europe shifting the horizon towards Southern Europe countries
17
 which for this reason were 
transforming from emigration countries to immigration countries. This shift was caused also 
by the end of colonialism in Africa and Asia and the improvement of living conditions of 
many former European colonies which allowed to these citizens to return to the motherland
18
. 
Simultaneously Latin America continued to be a country of emigration and US to be the main 
destination country in the world.  
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 marked the beginning of the sixth period of migration 
which together with Dissolution of the Soviet Union and conflicts in former Yugoslavia 
caused the establishment of large intra-European migration flows. This flows came mainly 
from the Eastern countries
19
 to UE-15 countries, but also to America, Israel and Russian 
Federation. This period seen also the establishment of another migration route, which was that 
towards the Persian Gulf due to a high demand of foreign manpower (mainly from Asia). 
The seventh and last period of history of international migration flows started in 2004 with 
the European enlargement to Eastern countries
20
 together with Malta and Cyprus. This new 
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 Such as Germany, France, United Kingdom Switzerland, Belgium and Holland.  
14
 Mainly from South Europe and North Africa. 
15
 Towards US and Europe. 
16
 Interruption of recruitment programs and the adoption of restrictive policies designed to promote the return of 
foreign workers to their source country. 
17
 Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece. 
18
 This is the case of migrations to France, United Kingdom, Holland, Belgium and Germany. 
19
 Such as Poland and Romania. 
20
 Eight countries of the former Soviet Union (UE-8). 
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openness has raised new fears of large migration flows into the EU-15 countries, forcing these 
countries to adopt substantial transitional arrangements, by prohibiting the access for almost 
seven years to the new EU citizens. Only United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden didn’t 
recourse to these measures with the consequence of attract the new European citizens towards 
these countries. To prove that the fears of the countries that have adopted restrictive policies 
towards the new European citizens were sank, there are European migrations, which despite 
increased from 893.000 in 2003 to 1.91 million in 2007, about 60% of these flows went to the 
UK and Ireland. Despite these European flows, US maintained the highest migration stock in 
the worldwide. 
 
1.2 Push and pull factors of migration 
 
The identification of causes concerning the migratory phenomenon is structurally connected 
to the discovery and the interpretation of social phenomena. This requires the research of a 
plurality of causes to explain what forces interact with the migratory fact, requiring therefore 
a very careful analysis. 
 
According to Censis report (2000), the determinants of migratory phenomenon are divided 
into 5 macro-groups: socio-economic, demographic and socio-political, the policy and 
military conflict ones, the natural and environmental ones and lastly, the economic and social 
globalization phenomenon ones. 
The category of socio-economic determinants includes most of the causes. In fact, within it, 
the main items turn out to be those related to wage issues, such as income inequality between 
countries or in the distribution of resources, or those related to more general aspects, such as 
conditions and expectancy of life, feeding and health conditions, cost of living index or the 
availability/unavailability of consumption goods. 
The second group of determinants are those related to demographic and socio-political 
conditions. In particular, this category covers facts surrounding the relationship between 
demographic growth and that of labour market. In fact the greater is the imbalance between 
population growth and that of the economy of one country over another, the greater will be 
the migratory pressure that will be created among countries involved. Among the political and 
social conditions, shall be considered unemployment, social tensions related to labour-market 
conditions, the shortage of public services such as health, social assistance and those 
conditions  related to the access to education system.  
17 
 
The third category of migration flows determinants covers issues related to the policy, issues 
related to wars and public disorders. Therefore this category covers situations ranging from 
the violation of political and religious freedom by some non-democratic regimes, to personal 
or social persecution, to armed conflict and internal strife, justifying these latter the mass 
migration from some countries and the development of refugees asylum seekers. 
 
Table 1.3. Push and Pull factors of migration flows 
 
Source: our elaborations 
 
The natural and environmental phenomena creates the fourth category. Environmental 
degradation and the adverse weather conditions such as floods, earthquakes, drought and 
desertification can easily affect both the working conditions of an individual and his living 
conditions
21
. For this reasons, in fact, migration can be generated by the occurrence of some 
disastrous natural events. 
Economic and social globalization phenomenon represents a separate group, classified as the 
fifth category of migration flows causes. This category tends to divide two types of 
migration: migration of qualified workers who are looking for more developed economies and 
those of unskilled workers who are searching for new employment opportunities. In 
particular, determinants of this category, unlike of the others, lead to change the country of 
origin and destination of migration flows over the years. 
At this point, after identifying the major macro-determinants of migration, it is possible to 
split these macro-reasons on push and pull factors, as shown in the Table 1.3. Push factors are 
those that, within a country, push an individual to emigrate, while pull factors are those that 
within a country, attract foreign people.  
                                                          
21
 Such as famines. 
Push factors Pull factors
Not enough jobs Job opportunities
Inadequate conditions Better living conditions
Natural disasters Attractive climate
Famine/drought Welfare
Poor medical care Better medical care
Loss of wealth Gain of wealth
Desire for more political/religious 
freedom
Feeling of having political and 
religious freedom
Discrimination High expectancy life index
War Industry
Deaths threats Security
Lack of good quality of education Good quality of education
18 
 
1.3 A portrait of foreign population in the European Union 
 
Describing immigrants in the European Union, it was chosen as representative category of 
migrants the foreign population (instead of foreign-born used for example in Australia and 
United States, even if there are small differences among the two categories) because in the EU 
most of countries accumulates data according to citizenship.  
The concept of foreign population includes resident persons born abroad who maintained 
citizenship in their origin country. To determine to which extent persons may or may not be 
of foreign nationality it depends both on citizenship legislation and what incentives on 
naturalization can have foreigners in the EU. For this analysis are used data from Eurostat, 
EU-LFS and EU-SILC
22
 considering 2008 as reference year
23
. 
For the category considered here, it is necessary first of all make a brief description on 
migration flows, since foreign resident population has been first and foremost the main actor 
of these flows.  
 
Figure 1.4. Migration inflows in the EU 
 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat database 
 
                                                          
22
Eurostat:data on migration flows, stocks by citizenship or country of birth, based on population registers or 
registers of resident foreign citizens, on sample of surveys or on a combination of data sources. 
EU-LFS: data on employment, unemployment and features of workers based on foreign resident population over 
15 years old or o private households. 
EU-SILC: data on income, social integration living conditions, education and health. 
23
 2008 is the referred year because is the reference year of the research on the fiscal impact of migration on the 
public budget of destination country analysis carried out in the second chapter. 
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In the first decade of 2000, migration flows reached the minimum peak in 2005 with 2.6 
million, but already restarted to increase in the following years, reaching the maximum peak 
in 2007 with about 4 million of people. Then the trend of flows restarted to be negative, 
probably due to the crisis that between 2008 and 2009 affected the economy of many 
countries, also creating a momentary break on migration flows. These flows started to rise 
again from 2010 (Figure 1.3), but never reaching the peak of 2007 to date. 
 
In 2008, 3.7 million of persons migrate in the EU-27
24
 on which about 2 million from other 
European countries and the remaining 1.7 million from non-member countries. The main 
European source country is Romania (384.000), followed by Poland (265.000), Bulgaria 
(91.100) and Germany (88.000), whereas the other non European source country are Morocco 
(157.000), China (97.000), India (93.000), Albania (81.000) and Ukraine (80.000).  
In absolute terms, the European country with highest share of immigrant is Germany first of 
all, followed by Spain, United Kingdom and Italy. 
 
Now, starting to describe the stock of immigrants in the EU in the demographic, economic 
and social perspective, it is necessary first of all to point out that we will refer to foreign 
population
25
. The demographic aspect covers themes as the amount of foreign residents, 
origin and destination country, composition by age and gender, acquisition of citizenship and 
composition of foreign households. 
Nowadays there are about 36 million of foreign people living in the European Union. In 2008 
there were instead about 32 million of people living in EU, of which 12 million persons 
originating in another European member state and 20 million persons originating in a non-
member countries.  
In absolute terms (Table 1.4), the main European country with the largest number of 
foreign residents is Germany (with 7 million), followed by Spain (5 million), UK (4 million), 
France (3.7 million) and Italy (3.4 million).  
Analyzing also the source country of these foreigners provided by Eurostat, it is possible to 
notice the vastness of provenance. But, considering only the 10 main origin country, as shown 
in the figure 1.5, the largest number of foreign population come from Turkey (2 million)first 
of all, followed those originating in Romania (1.7 million), Poland (1.4 million), Morocco 
                                                          
24
 In 2008 there were 27 countries, Croatia began to be part of it only in 2013. 
25
 In this section foreigners are those persons who not hold the same citizenship of the country in which they 
reside. Sometimes people are called here as non-nationals (or foreigners) which are those persons with foreign 
citizenship or as third-country nationals which are those persons with non-EU citizenship. 
20 
 
(1.3 million), Italy (1 million), UK (0.7 million), Germany (0.6 million), China, France and 
India
26
. 
 
Figure 1.5. Top ten foreign citizens in the EU-27, 2008 (% of foreign population on total 
native population ) 
 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat database 
 
Nevertheless, over the time the characteristics of foreign population could change due to 
several reasons, such as for the change of the number of births/deaths, the inflows/outflows, 
as well as for the acquisition of citizenship. In the European union, the acquisition of 
citizenships by foreigners can take place on several ways regulated by law, such as marriage 
and adoption or through naturalization process.  
In 2008, about 697 million of persons have acquired citizenship of an EU-27 country, of 
which about 90% from people with non-EU citizenship, due to numerous incentive that 
people could have. The larger number of acquisitions appears in France (137.000), followed 
by United Kingdom (137.300) and Germany (94.500). 
An important aspect to understand concerns the reasons that push a foreigner to migrate in an 
EU Member State, since these reasons may affect the destination country on different ways. 
Hence, according to LFS 2008 data
27
, it is possible to identify these reasons. 
                                                          
26
 In particular Turkish settled mainly in Germany and Austria; Romanians in Spain and Italy; Polish in UK and 
Germany; Moroccans in Spain and Italy; Italians in Germany and Belgium; British in Spain and Ireland; 
Germans in Spain and Austria; Chinese in Italy and Spain; French in UK and Belgium; Indians mainly in UK. 
27
 It refers only on 25-64 years old people . 
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As Figure 1.6 shows, almost 38% of people migrate for employment-related reasons and 37% 
for family reasons which signify that the majority of persons migrate to find better 
opportunities of work, but also for family reunification, namely when a family member 
migrated in the past and then only after some years the other family components reach their 
loved. 
 
Figure 1.6. Main reasons for migration of foreign born population, 2008
 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat 
 
Considering now the age composition at European level, migrants are on average younger that 
nationals. In fact while the median age of foreigners is 34.3 (focusing primarily on the 25-35 
range), that of nationals is about 42 years old. In particular, among foreigners there is a clear 
distinction between those that come from another Member State and those that come from 
third-country. More specifically, while the former have a median age of about 36.9, the latter 
have a median age of about 33 years.  
Now, concerning the gender composition instead, there is an opposite situation between 
native and foreign residents. In fact, while foreign residents are composed for 51% by men 
and 49% by women, nationals are instead for 51% women and for 49% men. 
The last demographic aspect to consider in this paper regards the composition of foreign 
households than that of nationals, measured in terms of share of foreign citizens living in a 
private household with or without dependent children (under 15 years). The LFS 2008 shows 
that 37% of foreign citizens live in household with two adults and a child at least, while 13% 
of them live in couples without children, unlike nationals who have lower rates, 32% and 15% 
respectively. 
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The second relevant feature in this elaboration concerns the economic aspect of migrants, 
focusing mainly on the labour market issues, as the activity rate, unemployment and 
employment rate and the sectors of employment, comparing them with nationals, but also 
distinguishing them between citizens from another UE-27 country and third-country 
nationals. 
The first economic index used is the activity rate, defined as the ratio between the 
economically active population (employed and unemployed persons) and the total population 
(active and inactive persons). 
 
Table 1.7. Labour market index, 2008 (%) 
 NATIONALS FOREIGN 
CITIZENS 
EU-27 citizens Third-country 
nationals 
Activity rate 85 80 84 77 
Unemployment rate 6 11 8 13 
Employment rate 80 71 78 67 
Overqualification 19 39 31 46 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat (2011) 
 
As shown in the table 1.7, in 2008 the activity rate of foreigners is about 80%, five points less 
than that of nationals. This gap is probably due to the lower activity rate of third country 
nationals (77%) because inside this category there is an higher presence of inactive women in 
the labor market, probably due to the higher number of dependent children compared to that 
of foreign EU-27 and national women.  
The second index describes the unemployment rate, measured as ratio between the 
unemployed population and the economically active population. As the Table 1.7 shows, 
foreign unemployment rate is equal to 11% compared with the 6% of nationals. This large 
difference depends mainly on the third-country nationals (13%) because they are 
characterized by a lower educational attainment than other citizens or because they have more 
problems with language, or problems related to discrimination or because their skills and 
qualifications earned abroad are scarcely recognized. 
The third index analyzed is the employment rate, measured as the ratio between the 
employed population and the total population. In 2008, foreign employment rate was 9 points 
lower than that of nationals. This is due to some third-country characteristics because the 
employment rate of EU-27 citizens was similar to that of nationals.  
23 
 
These negative characteristics could come from a combination of lower participation rate of 
third-country women and a high probability to have difficulties in integration into the labour 
market. The length of stay in a receiving country results to have a positive effect on the 
foreigners employment rate. In fact, according to LFS 2008, migrants which reside for more 
than 8 years in the receiving country, seems to have a better employment rate and a better 
sector of employment than those of the first years after their arrive.  
In this regard, the main employment sectors differ widely among both citizenships and 
genders (Table 1.8). 
 
Table 1.8. Top main employment sectors by gender and citizenship in the EU-27 (%) 
 
NATIONALS 
FOREIGN 
CITIZENS 
Third-country 
nationals 
Men    
Construction 13 23 23 
Manufacturing 22 21 21 
Wholesale and Retail trade 13 11 12 
Accommodation and food service activities 3 9 10 
Transportation and storage 8 7 7 
Administrative and support service activities 3 5 6 
Information and communication 4 3 3 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 5 3 3 
Human, health and social work activities 4 3 3 
Agriculture 5 3 3 
Women    
Activities of households as employers 1 15 18 
Human, health and social work activities 17 13 13 
Accommodation and food service activities 4 13 13 
Wholesale and Retail trade 15 12 13 
Manufacturing 12 10 9 
Administrative and support service activities  4 9 10 
Education 12 5 4 
Other service and activities 3 4 4 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 5 4 3 
Financial and insurance activities 4 2 2 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
 
The main employment sectors, being equal of citizenship and gender, appears to be 
manufacturing, wholesale and retail trades. Men are over-represented in the construction, 
transportation and storage sectors, whereas women are overrepresented in human, health, 
social work activities and education sectors. Distinguishing sectors among citizenship instead, 
foreign citizens are underrepresented in the Public Administration, defense and education, 
probably due to some restrictions for foreigners on the access to jobs in the public sector, and 
are overrepresented in construction (male gender), in activities of household as employers 
(female gender) and in the accommodation ad food service sectors or in the administrative 
and support service activities (both genders). 
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However, when we talk about employment, a relevant important topic concerns the 
overqualification phenomenon.  
This term represents the state of being employed in jobs which requires lower qualifications 
or skills than those that an individual owns. To analyze this phenomenon there is the 
overqualification rate which consider the share of tertiary education (ISCED 5 or 6) which 
works in a low-medium skilled job (ISCO occupation level 4 to 9) among employed persons 
having achieved a tertiary education. 
The overqualification rate of foreign citizens, shown in Table 1.7, is about 39%, compared to 
18% of nationals. This gap goes to highlight the potential misuse of migrants’ qualification 
and skills. This index is greater for third-country nationals (46%) due to the same reasons 
outlined just above. 
Even in this case, as for the employment sectors, according to LFS 2008, the length of stay in 
the receiving country impact on this phenomenon. In fact, foreign citizens which reside for 
over 8 years in the receiving country, have more probability to see recognized their 
qualification earned abroad, but this occur mainly to foreign EU citizens instead of third-
country nationals. 
 
Finally, the last major issue to consider when we talk about migration concerns the social 
aspect. This aspect covers issues regarding income distribution, overcrowding phenomenon, 
poverty, social exclusion but also the education level of migrants.  
The income distribution is the first important aspect to consider and in this elaboration is 
identifies as disposable income, namely the gross income less taxes and contributions paid by 
an individual plus social and any other private transfers received. In 2008, foreign citizens’ 
disposable income
28
 turns out to be much lower than that of nationals in almost all European 
countries (Table 1.9). 
In absolute values, foreign citizens with the lowest income level (less than 10.000 €) reside in 
Hungary, Slovakia, Lithuania, Estonia, Greece and Czech Republic whereas those with 
highest income level reside in Luxemburg, Germany, Norway and United Kingdom.  
At citizenship level instead, third-country nationals have a lower income than that of EU-27 
citizens.  
  
                                                          
28
 Expressed at purchasing power parity 
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Table 1.9. Average annual disposable income per household, per citizenship and at 
purchasing power parity, 2008 (€) 
 
Source: Eurostat (2011) 
 
Another important element is the risk of poverty and social exclusion of persons, measured 
on three dimensions: risk of poverty after social transfers received, deprivation of some 
fundamental materials and living in very low-work intensity household. According to Eurostat 
(2011) and EU-SILC 2008, the 32% of foreign citizens are at risk poverty, compared to the 
20% of nationals. This risk is greater when considering third-country nationals, whereas the 
risk of EU-27 citizens is almost similar to that of nationals. 
Overcrowding phenomenon is a big issue when considering the foreign households. In fact in 
2008, there are about 27% of foreign citizens living in small spaces in their home, compared 
to 18% of nationals. The situation is even worse for third-country nationals since the 31% of 
them live in a overcrowded house. 
At educational level, according to LFS 2008, foreign citizens
29
 have lower level of education 
than nationals, in fact the 23% of them are highly educated whereas the 38% of them have a 
lower educational attainment. However migrants according to their educational attainment 
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 In working age group 25-54. 
Total
without 
dependent 
children
with 
dependent 
children
Total
without 
dependent 
children
with 
dependent 
children
Total
without 
dependent 
children
with 
dependent 
children
Total
without 
dependent 
children
with 
dependent 
children
Belgium 19.582 22.520 19.153 13.898 17.662 13.351 16.707 19.599 16.193 11.340 14.675 11.340
Bulgaria 5.577 6.356 5.159
Czech Rep. 10.608 12.573 9.955 9.864 10.742 8.716 10.176 11.354 9.340 8.375 8.375
Denmark 19.444 23.264 19.708 15.274 21.696 14.990 18.414 18.275 14.559 19.775 14.796
Germany 19.839 23.652 19.258 16.713 20.917 16.294 19.686 23.193 19.281 15.066 19.090 14.635
Estonia 8.741 10.180 8.496 7.998 9.094 7.813 7.978 9.094 7.783
Ireland 20.772 25.690 20.180 18.931 23.381 17.523 18.481 24.878 16.607 19.080 19.902
Greece 13.725 14.427 13.035 9.768 11.792 8.658 10.751 12.626 10.182 9.501 11.646 8.368
Spain 15.704 18.043 14.059 12.937 15.351 11.374 14.485 17.234 13.746 12.252 14.326 10.651
Frace 18.574 20.861 18.124 15.409 18.678 14.478 19.081 22.202 17.919 13.893 16.410 12.987
Italy 16.871 19.364 15.145 12.682 14.846 11.883 14.043 15.892 13.863 11.977 14.481 11.285
Cyprus 21.133 23.203 20.399 17.437 16.705 18.355 21.289 20.894 22.179 14.771 14.091 15.637
Latvia 8.308 9.458 8.252 8.325 9.832 7.909 8.623 9.832 7.922
Lithuania 7.852 8.876 7.664 8.110 10.550 7.366 8.056 10.376 6.946
Luxemburg 30.405 34.225 28.219 24.256 29.815 22.442 24.962 29.815 22.691 21.140 28.067 19.483
Hungary 6.842 7.895 6.366 6.562 6.184 6.376 6.352
Malta 13.898 17.116 12.590 14.550 11.946 13.983 11.922 14.765 12.920
Netherlands 20.788 25.444 19.685 18.088 23.848 17.703 18.239 18.863 17.931 23.608 17.480
Austia 20.880 23.974 19.608 14.975 17.430 14.638 17.867 17.153 14.246 15.084 14.166
Poland 7.105 8.133 6.595 18.966
Portugal 10.354 11.685 9.591 10.308 13.214 8.976 10.335 10.308 15.951 8.821
Romania 3.430 4.233 3.152
Sloveia 14.687 15.993 14.400 12.932 14.613 12.770 13.981 14.319 12.923 14.613 12.604
Slovakia 7.356 8.632 6.887 7.645 7.661
Finland 18.542 22.591 18.109 14.596 18.621 12.544 17.663 17.311 12.225 17.265 10.791
Sweden 19.483 23.709 19.081 15.232 19.800 15.144 18.494 23.013 17.681 14.349 17.388 14.436
UK 21.275 25.647 19.530 20.170 26.172 18.296 23.365 24.714 19.371 18.496 26.267 16.663
NATIONALS FOREIGN CITIZENS EU-27 citizens Third-country nationals
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tends to differ among the European Member States. In fact countries as Ireland, Sweden and 
Norway are characterized by tertiary educated migrants, whereas country as Portugal, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Germany are characterized by migrants with low educational attainment. 
 
1.4 Salient features of the foreign population in Italy 
 
The main issues to consider in the description of foreign
30
 population that reside in Italy 
regards the demographic, economic and social aspects, as done in the above description at 
European level. In this case is considered 2013
31
 as base year, through the use of Istat, MeF, 
Banca d’Italia, Eurostat data and Fondazione Leone Moressa’s elaborations. 
 
In the last twenty years, migration flows represent the prevailing demographic factor of 
growth in Italy, producing a positive net migration and helping to change the resident 
population in quantitative and structural standpoint. However, this trend has been gradually 
reduced over time: in 2014 the growth of the population has stopped just 13.000 units since 
the positive net migration with foreign countries (+141 thousand) was able to offset even a 
largely negative natural balance (-96 thousand). The role foreign inflows, opposed to the more 
problematic evolutionary path of de-natural growth, was the main key to understanding the 
recent demographic trends on a national scale. In the perspective key, that role seems to be 
partly compromised: according to the first provisional data of 2015 related to the period from 
January to June, there was a net migration of just 66.000 units compared to the natural 
balance that has already exceeded 103.000 of deficit units. 
Comparing actual situation with that of the recent past it is possible to observe that the current 
ones is not represented only by the negative effects of de-birth rate, but also by the loss of 
attractiveness of the country in respect of international migrants. Immigrations over the last 
five years have fallen by 38%, from 448.000 units in 2010 to 278.000 in 2014. The emigration 
rather are more than doubled, shifting from 67.000 to 136.000 units. The net migration is 
equal to 141 thousand units, registering the lowest level in the last eight years. However 
remains fundamental the contribution of the foreign component on the Italian population, 
ensuring a positive net migration of over 200.000 residents, although down compared to 
previous years. The foreign population, however, offers a more than positive contribution to 
the difference between births and deaths (+69 thousand). 
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 As people with non Italian citizenship having their usual residence in Italy. 
31
 Using data referred to 2011 or 2012 for some exceptions. 
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Figure 1.10. Migration inflows and net migration in Italy, 2006-2014 
 
Source: Istat 
 
The demographic aspect covers themes as the amount of foreign residents, acquisition of 
citizenship, origin and destination country, composition by age and gender, and composition 
of foreign households. 
According to Istat data on the national demographic balance, at the date of 1 January 2016, 
were legally resident in Italy 5.026.153 foreign citizens, equal to 8.3% of the total resident 
population (60.665.551). In 2013, the foreign population residing in Italy reached about 4.4 
million, of which 1.2 million by EU citizens and 3.1 million by non-EU citizens
32
, with a 
growth accounting for 69.2% since 2007. This remarkable growth is not due to the increase of 
migration flows, which have had a sharp decline for the 2008 economic crisis and that to date, 
despite the recovery, did not reach the level of 2007, but instead to the numerous foreign 
births and acquisitions of citizenship. In fact in 2013 citizenship acquisitions achieved the 
value of 65.383, of which about 93% by former non-EU citizens and 7% by EU citizens
33
. 
This indicator includes acquisition of citizenship by marriage
34
, which alone represents a 
fairly frequent mode of citizenship’s acquisition or through other ways such as naturalization 
and “ius sanguinis” acquisition. 
A peculiar appearance of the foreign presence in Italy is the strong heterogeneity of 
community of origin. The main country of origin is Romania with 933.352 foreigners (21% 
of total foreign residents) probably due to the recent membership to the European Union, 
followed by Albania with 464.962 individuals (11%), probably motivated by the exemption 
from entry visa for a maximum stay of 90 days, and from Morocco with 426.791 people. 
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 In this case the European countries are 28. 
33
 Mainly Morocco (14.278), Albania (9.493) and Romania (3.272). 
34
 In fact since foreign women are outnumber than men, mixed marriages with an Italian citizen turn out to be a 
fairly frequent mode of acquisition of citizenship. 
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Following the other major communities of origin appear to be, even if to a lesser extent, china 
(223.367), Ukraine (191.725), Philippines (139.835), Moldavia (139.734), India (128.903), 
Peru (99.173) and lastly Bangladesh (92.695).  
 
Figure 1.11. Foreign resident population by region of destination, 2013
 
Source: our elaborations on Istat data 
 
In 2013, in absolute terms, the region of destination preferred is Lombardia with about 1 
million of foreign people, followed by Emilia Romagna, Veneto and Lazio (Figure 1.11) . 
Foreign population appears to be rather younger than natives, with a greater concentration of 
them in the 25-34 years range.  
The gender composition at national level appears to be fairly balanced with women that 
account for 53% of foreign population and men for 47%. However, the gender composition 
varies according to citizenship: in fact whereas the female gender is composed mostly of 
women from Romania, the male gender is mainly composed of individuals from third 
countries
35
. 
Finally the last major demographic aspect concerns the family composition of foreign 
population. FLM elaborations on the Banca d’Italia data relating to 2012 states that the 
                                                          
35
 While Asian migrants results to be more balanced. 
29 
 
foreign population is composed for 37.8% by a single component, for 11% by 2 components, 
for 16.2% of cases by 3 components and for 35% of cases by 4 or more components
36
. 
The second relevant feature in the description of foreign resident population, namely the 
economic aspect, focuses mainly on the labour market issues as the activity rate, 
unemployment rate, employment rate and the relative sectors of employment, comparing 
foreigner with national citizens. 
As shown in the Table 1.12, the activity rate of foreign population turns out to be higher than 
that of native population. This difference is probably explained to the different demographic 
structure between the two populations. In fact, while the most foreign population with more 
than 15 years is active in the labour market (69%),among natives this percentage is well 
below that value (47%). This is directly related to the inactivity rate, which among natives 
turns out to be higher than that of foreigners (53% and 31% respectively). 
 
Table 1.12. Labour market index by citizenship, 2013, (%)
 
Source: our elaborations on Istat data 
 
Even in the case of the unemployment rate, the one that refers to foreigners appears to be 
greater than that of natives. This difference is probably justified by the greater vulnerability to 
economic cycles
37
 of the sectors where immigrants are mainly employed.  
Different appears instead the situation concerning the employment rate, because looking at 
table 1.12, the rate related to foreigners proves to be greater than that of native. This is an 
abnormal case if compared it with other European countries where the employment rate for 
natives is higher than that of migrants
38
.  
In this case, however, since this rate varies greatly among gender and citizenships, it is 
necessary to look over that distinction. In fact, although the employment rate of women is 
lower than that of men, being equal to gender, the rate of foreign women is higher than that of 
natives. This is probably justified by the higher employment of foreign women in sectors that 
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 Unlike Italian family composed for 27.% of cases by a single component, 29.2% by 2 components, 19.6% by 3 
components and 23.6% by 4 or more components. 
37
 As the recent economic crisis. 
38
 As in France, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium. 
Male Female Total Male Female Total
Activity rate 72,4 52,8 62,6 81,6 60,9 70,5
Unemployment rate 11,0 12,4 11,6 16,6 18,0 17,2
Employment rate 64,3 46,1 55,2 68,1 49,8 58,3
NATIONALS FOREIGNERS
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have less suffered the recent crisis or due to greater incentives in the labour market 
participation as a result of the householder men job loss. 
In the matter of employment sectors, there is a clear distinction among natives and migrants. 
Whereas natives are distributed more evenly among sectors with an higher presence in public 
areas
39
, foreigners are employed mainly in three categories. In fact, as Table 1.13 shows, 
28,9% of foreigners is employed in personal services, 18,4% in industry and 13,3% in 
construction. 
 
Table 1.13. Main employment sectors by citizenship, 2013 (%) 
 
Source: FLM elaborations on Istat data 
 
In particular, based on origin country and gender composition of foreign citizens there are 
some difference in the employment sectors. Migrants that comes from Albania are mainly 
employed in the construction sectors, whereas Moldovans and Ukrainians in the personal 
services and housekeeping, whereas Filipinos in personal assistance sector. Considering data 
by gender instead, the most common job profile among men is that specialized in the 
construction sector, whereas among women prevails employment in domestic services. 
However, the concentration of worker in a limited number of sectors limits also the quality of 
the occupations, professional roles and job classification of foreigners since most of them 
focuses on unskilled occupations. Considering the labour market situation is necessary to 
keep in mind that 2013 turns out to be in the post-economic crisis period and this fact explains 
why there is a sharp employment reduction in many sectors, both for natives and migrants, 
and a further overqualification of foreign citizens. 
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 Mainly in education, health services and public administration sectors. 
NATIONALS FOREIGNERS
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 3.5 4.7
Industry 20.4 18.4
Construction 6.4 13.3
Commerce 15.6 8.5
Accomodation and food service activities 5.1 9.3
Transportation and communication 7.4 5.1
Real estate and financial activities, busiess services 14.4 7.0
Education, healt, social services, public administration 22.1 4.8
Other collective or personal services 5.2 28.9
Total 100.0 100.0
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Finally, the last important aspect in the description of foreign resident population, namely the 
social aspect, covers themes as poverty, housing condition and household income. 
According to data from FLM (2014) and Banca d’Italia related to 2012, there is a clear 
evidence about the fragility of foreign household in terms of poverty index
40
: whereas the 
percentage of Italian low income household reaches 12.4%, that referred to foreign 
households rises to 33.9%.  
Another important indicator regards the housing conditions which instead marks a further 
inequality among native and foreign households. In fact whereas 71.2% of Italian households 
live in a home ownership and the 17.8% in tenancy, foreign households live for the majority 
of cases in tenancy (74.8%) and only 13.6% are the owner. Furthermore foreign households 
are concentrated in the suburban areas, living in small dwellings and showing frequent 
overcrowding situations
41
 (36.7% of foreign households cases versus 9.9% of native 
households). An issue to be reckoned on housing conditions regard the fact that rental 
properties where foreign households reside are for 89.1% of cases owned by a private 
institution and only 10.9% by a public institution. This wants to underline that if compared to 
Italian housing conditions where 35.2% of households in tenancy reside in a public 
ownership, foreigners have less access to public residential housing, as well as to other forms 
of housing welfare. 
Considering income distribution, according to Banca d’Italia data, there is a clear evidence 
of the wide inequality among the two types of household, because foreign households dispose 
on average half of native household income (about 16.629 versus 31.400 respectively, in 
2012). 
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 According to Banca d’Italia definitions’ ,with poor individuals term means the share of persons which lives 
below the poverty threshold, that for 2012 amounts to 7.678 €, defined as the half of the equivalent median 
income. 
41
 According to Banca d’Italia definitions’ overcrowding occurs when the dwelling residence size is below 30 
square meters per cohabitant component.  
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CHAPTER 2. FISCAL IMPACT OF MIGRATION ON 
DESTINATION’S COUNTRY SUSTAINABILITY 
 
2.1 Impact of migration in the European Union: an overview 
 
As shown in the first chapter, Europe today represents one of the main continents of 
destination of migration flows. Furthermore, the combination of the recent financial crisis, 
which deteriorated the public balance of many countries, together with the ageing of native 
population, which reinforce the budgetary imbalance, and the growing share of immigrants on 
the total native population, create tensions among natives.  
In fact is widespread among inhabitants the impression that immigrants represent an expense 
to the State Budget of a country, because they benefit more in public transfers and contribute 
less in taxes, further exacerbating the general government balance.  
This raises the question on whether and to what extent immigrants contribute in fiscal terms 
to the State Budget of the country on which they decide to settle. For this reason in this 
section we found the debate on what is the fiscal impact of immigrants on State Budget of 
destination country, making a comparative analysis at European level.  
To make possible this type of analysis we will analyze the fiscal impact of immigrants in 
terms of net contributions in a given year, resulting from the difference between the 
contributions paid and benefits received by them, estimated in some cases at average level per 
household and in other at overall national level . 
Until now, there are still few empirical studies which analyze the fiscal impact of immigrants 
at comparative level, due to the difficulties of tracing perfectly coincident data across 
countries
42
. For this reason, the majority of available empirical studies analyze net 
contributions of immigrants considering only part of the public budget revenues and 
expenditures relating to the immigrant population. 
Among these there are those carried out by Boeri (2009), OECD (2013) and Huber & 
Oberdaberning (2013). 
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 Problems on different data available as transfers and taxes components, reference period, concept of 
immigrant population (if foreign born or foreign citizenship), nature of the social protection system, legislation 
on migration and access conditions to public benefits 
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The first paper, based on EU-Silc 2004-2007 data
43
, estimates the average net contribution of 
immigrant households for eleven European countries
44
. In terms of contributions Boeri (2009) 
considers income taxes and social security contributions (paid by both employer and employee) 
whereas in terms of benefits items considers unemployment, old age, survivors’, sickness and 
disability benefits as contributory benefits and housing allowances, family-related transfers 
and social exclusion benefits
45
 as social transfers.  
The analysis shows that, across countries, there is a large heterogeneity on the average net 
contribution of migrants, with positive results in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden 
and UK, ranging from €800 € (Sweden) to €12.500 (UK) per household and negative net 
contributions in Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland and Luxembourg with an average ranging 
from €-1.000 (Denmark) to € -3.000 (Finland) per household.  
Looking at the two items that compose net contributions, there is a strong evidence that, on 
average, migrants contribute less to public budget rather than abuse it in terms of benefits.  
In terms of social contributions and taxes, foreigners are more likely to contribute less than 
native population because, beyond the fact that among foreign resident those that contribute 
are about half
46
 of them, in the European system where taxes are progressive and social 
security contributions are proportional to earnings, immigrant’s contributions are very low. In 
terms of benefits instead, foreigners have less probability to receive contributory transfers 
than native population, whereas are overrepresented in the social transfer recipient. However, 
as explained before, social transfer to migrant population have a lesser amount than the 
contributory transfers to native population
47
.  
Furthermore, Boeri points out that, since contributory benefits typically not require the 
mobilizing of the General Government revenues, migrant population may affect the generic 
taxpayer increasing the tax burden in different ways, as for example in a situation where 
migrant population has an higher unemployment rate than the average, making them less 
contributors and more beneficiaries
48
, or when migrants receive many social transfers that 
lead them to have less incentives to seek a job. In these cases migrants became more “welfare 
dependent” than natives, draining resource also from contributory schemes.  
 
                                                          
43
EU-SILC is a standardized annual survey that provides detailed information on tax and benefits position of 
interviewers and their family components. To make an analysis for different years, the author made an average 
estimates per year. 
44
 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Spain, Sweden, UK. 
45
 Excluding health and education transfers due to the difficulty to recover that data. 
46
 With some exceptions as in Spain, Belgium and Austria. 
47
 Nevertheless, we have to notice that in this study expenses on public health and education referred to migrants 
are not considered, even if the public education spending on immigrant population seems to be in pretty strong 
measure. 
48
 In terms of unemployment benefits, pension minima against the labour market risk.  
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OECD (2013) estimates the average net contributions for 21 European countries on the basis 
of Eu-Silc 2007-2009 data
49
. In terms of contributions, it considers the so-called “direct 
monetary transfers” that regards the income taxes and social security contributions50, whereas 
in terms of benefits it considers pension benefits (old age and survivors), unemployment 
benefits, housing allowances, family allowances and social assistance benefits. As shown in 
the Figure 2.1, the average net contribution of migrant household in the EU is positive, with 
an amount equal to €2.130  per household. 
 
Figure 2.1. Average net direct contribution per household, by household type(€), 2007-
2009 average
 
Source: OECD (2013) on Eu-Silc database 
 
Average net contributions of migrant households are positive in fifteen countries out 21, with 
amounts ranging from €896 (Sweden) to €9.178 (Luxembourg) per household; net 
contributions are negative in the remaining five countries with amounts ranging from €184  
(Czech Republic) to €5.691 (Poland) per household. Compared with native households, net 
contribution of foreigners are on average lower by €1600 per household, with some 
exceptions in those countries with recent labour migration flows (Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal) on which seems that migrant households contribute more than natives households 
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 Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
Estimates per average household are further averaged among the three years analyzed. 
50
 Social security contributions of both employer and employee. 
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and in those countries characterized by previous “guestworker flows”51 on which seems that 
migrants contribute less than natives. 
The difference in net contribution between migrant and native households might depend on 
different incidence on the single items of contributions and benefits. Hence looking separately 
contributions and benefits that these types of households provide to the public purse and the 
transfers that they receive, the difference in the average net fiscal contribution of immigrant 
versus native born households are driven by lower contribution rather than higher benefits 
receipt. 
In fact, the average EU difference in contributions is equal to about €-3.500  whereas in 
benefits to about €-1.900 per household. Indeed, the difference in benefits is on average 
negative, because, including the pension system in this analysis, migrants receive on average 
lower pension payments than native households
52
. However there are some exceptions where 
the difference in benefits of migrant versus native households is positive. This occurs in those 
countries characterized by large aging immigrant population as in Germany, Poland and 
France. The contrary occurs in country with recent labour migration flows, as in Italy, Spain 
and Greece. 
 
The last research taken into consideration was developed by Huber & Oberdaberning (2013), 
that basing on Eu-silc 2009 data, estimates the average net contribution of migrants in 19 
European countries
53
, considering the same contribution and benefits items used by Boeri 
(2009). 
From the estimates appears even in this case an heterogeneity in terms of average net 
contributions. In fact, even if the average net contributions of migrant households have a 
negative impact on the state budget overall, in 10 out 19 countries results are positive and 
range from €582 (UK) to €3.438 (Luxembourg) per household, whereas in the remaining 9 
countries outcomes are negative with values ranging from €1.360 (Latvia) to €8.119  
(Germany). Native households instead, contribute positively only in 6 countries. Typically, 
net contributions of migrants are negative in the same countries where native households 
contribute negatively to the state budget.  
                                                          
51
 France and Germany: in these countries migrants were attracted by some government laws developed for the 
necessity to satisfy the wide demand for manpower not satisfied by native supply in those years, for then restrict 
the access to new migrants, causing an imbalance between contribution and benefits from/to immigrant 
population due to the increase of the number of migrants in retirement age and a reduction in working age, in 
countries with big problems about the aging of native population. 
52
 Excluding the pension system does not alter the results fundamentally. 
53
 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech republic, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Luxemburg, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, United Kingdom. 
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However exist some exceptions, as in Germany, where the negative net contribution of 
migrants and those positive of native households is basically due to the fact that the amount of 
benefits that migrants received is higher than the amount of contributions that they paid. In 
this regard appears that in those countries where migrants receive more benefits overall, even 
their take-up rates are very high. This could explain reasons for which migrants decide to 
move to a country instead of another. However Huber & Oberdaberning (2013) appoints that, 
as the other two authors described above, the lower average net contributions of migrant 
versus native households is probably due to lower contributions paid instead of higher 
benefits received. This, in turn, depends on the lower wages earned by foreigners in addition 
to some “behavioral differences”, meant as the higher share of migrants who works in black 
marketeering or the higher discretion over tax payments when migrants are self-employed. 
 
Nevertheless, although net contributions resulting from these research appear to be conflicting 
on the amount of net contribution for the same country, due to the different expenditure items 
examined (whereas revenue items are identical), however seem to agree on the impact (if 
positive of negative) that in general an immigrant household has in the country of 
resettlement.  
 
Table 2.2. Average net contribution per immigrant household on State Budget of those 
countries present in all the inquiries (€) 
 
Source: our elaborations on Boeri (2009), OECD (2013) and Huber & Oberdaberning (2013) estimations 
Boeri (2009) OECD (2013) 
Huber & 
Oberdaberning 
(2013) 
Fiscal impact in 
terms of net 
contributions
Luxembourg -1.887 9.178 3.438 +
Italy 9.148 2.664 +
Greece 7.728 1.694 +
Spain 8.047 7.496 414 +
Belgium 11.788 5.560 810 +
Portugal 4.479 1.294 +
United Kingdom 12.533 3.029 582 +
Slovenia 3.006 1.929 +
Netherlands 2.544 3.792 +
Austria 9.481 2.353 -1.910 +
Sweden 839 896 1.801 +
Ireland -1.937 -1.274 -5.451 -
France -2.285 -1.451 -7.171 -
Germany 3.137 -5.633 -8.119 -
Source data: EU-Silc 2004-2007 Eu-Silc 2007-2009 Eu-silc 2009
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In fact, the table 2.2. shows the net contributions resulting from the studies analyzed, referring 
only to the countries where it is possible to make a comparison between the results. In terms 
of fiscal impact (positive or negative) of immigrant households appears that in most countries 
characterized by recent migration as Italy, Spain and Greece immigrants make a positive 
contribution to the public budget, while the opposite occurs in those countries characterized 
by an ancient immigration, as Germany and France. 
But, since these empirical studies analyze the net contributions of immigrants considering 
only part of the public budget revenues and expenditures relating to the immigrant population, 
this could not better represent the real impact of these immigrants
54
. Then analyzing the fiscal 
impact of immigrants through a more detailed analysis (referring to the fact of adding more 
categories of expenditures and revenues) it will be possible to have a clearer idea on the 
situation at European level, although as we shall see, the effects resulting from these research 
coincide with those of the analysis that will be described later, for most of the countries. 
 
OECD (2013) has developed another and more detailed analysis, including on the revenues 
side other than income taxes and social security contribution also indirect taxes as VAT, and 
property tax, accounting for 74% of the total government revenues. On the expenditures side 
other than social protection transfers
55
 it includes also education, health expenses, as well as 
the active labour market policy costs, representing almost 63% of total government expenses 
overall
56
. In this case OECD estimates the overall fiscal impact of migration on national GDP 
over the 2007-2009 average, as shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
From this type of analysis appears that the overall fiscal impact of migration seems to be 
positive and on average of about 0.35% in terms of GDP in the baseline scenario. The result is 
positive in 15 out 21countries. In particular, the fiscal impact of immigrants is largest in 
Luxembourg (2% on GDP), characterized by a migrant population that mainly comes from 
developed countries, with an high employment and specialization rate. Then there are 
countries as Italy and Greece (0.98% on GDP), characterized by recent migration flows and in 
working age that could generate a positive contribution. In contrast, the impact of migration is 
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Probably because omitting expenditures on health and education for example, can change results substantially. 
55
 Detailed description of items are mentioned above, in OECD (2013). 
56
 From the analysis are excluded instead the items as corporate income tax and taxes on specific goods and 
services on the revenues side, and on the expenses side costs for the public administration, infrastructure and 
defense. 
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negative in countries as Germany (-1.1% on GDP) due to a large share of migrants that 
receive pension benefits
57
 . 
 
Figure 2.3. Overall net fiscal impact of immigrants estimated in terms of GDP (%), with 
and without the pension system, 2007-2009 average
 
Source: OECD (2013) on Eu-Silc database, General Government Accounts and OECD Revenue Statistics 
 
Germany is then followed by France (-0.52% on GDP) and Poland (-0.32%) where the 
advanced average age explains the negative impact of foreigners. Excluding from the calculus 
pension benefits, the net contributions of migrants improve on average about the 0.65% on 
GDP and, at country level in Germany, France and Austria. The contrary occurs in Spain, 
where only few migrants receive pension benefits. Nevertheless, taking into consideration 
only a part of revenues/expenses of General Government the estimates developed represents 
an approximation. OECD has in fact consider that, including all other items (except defense), 
the fiscal impact on average seems to be negative (-0.42% on GDP).  
However, considering that migrants represents only the 10% of total population, and also that 
in those countries there were a budget deficit of 1.5% on average, appears pretty sure to 
sustain that the impact of migration is neutral in most of the European countries. Overall, the 
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fiscal impact of migration in terms of GDP is insignificant, never exceeding, positively or 
negatively, the 0.5% of national GDP
58
.  
 
2.2 Immigrants and the Italian Public Budget: estimates in the short term 
 
As shown in the previous section, the fiscal impact of migration in Italy turns out to be 
positive for all the research analyzed. It is therefore interesting to observe recent and more 
detailed reports on the impact of migration on the sustainability of the Italian welfare state. 
Even in this section will be reported estimations on the fiscal impact of foreigners through 
their net contribution, resulting from the difference between the contributions paid and 
benefits received by them. In particular, whereas the first report (Devillanova 2011) estimates 
the impact in terms of average net contributions per household, the other two reports 
examined (Banca d’Italia 2009 and Idos-Unar 2015) estimates the impact trying to evaluate 
the debit and credit relationships between migrants and Italian Public Budget.  
 
Devillanova (2011) estimates the average net contributions of migrant
59
 and native 
households using Eu-Silc 2007 database. For this evaluation it considers as contributions 
taxes on income (IRPEF and financial activities), social security contributions and Ici
60
, and 
as benefits family and housing allowances, social exclusion benefits, unemployment, old-age 
and survivors benefits, invalidity, and monetary transfers for education and health. This report 
shown that the migrant’s average net contributions change according to the country of origin. 
In fact, while net non-EU migrant contributions are on average equal to €346 per household, 
those relative to migrants from other EU countries are negative and on average equal to € -
252 per household, in a country where average net contributions of native population are 
negative and equal to € -3.000 per household. Considering revenues and expenditures items 
that compose the Italian State Budget, it is possible to identify which items have the greatest 
impact, changing net contributions of the different population. Overall, migrant households 
contribute on average less in taxes than Italian households, as well as receive lower benefits 
than these latter.  
In terms of contributions, if an Italian household pays fees equal to 13.367€ on average, an 
EU/non-EU migrant household contribute with a lower amount respectively of about 1.660€ 
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 Clearly is only an hypothesis  since in the sample are considered only resident population, excluding asylum 
seekers, that in the recent years are increasing rapidly,  and irregular migrants. 
59
Identification of migrant and Italian households takes place through the attribution of the country of birth of the 
households’ head. In this case Devillanova divides further migrants in Europeans and non Europeans. 
60
 Local council property tax. 
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and 2.460€ on average. These differences among country of birth depends mainly by the fact 
that native households give greater contributions in the form of personal income taxes and 
ICI, rather than in social contributions. In particular, this distinction is more pronounced 
among Italian and non-EU immigrant households
61
, as a result of lower taxes due to lower 
earnings and, conversely, to an higher social contributions due to higher activity rate of these 
latter.  
In terms of benefits, the fact that migrant households receive a lesser overall amount than 
natives is mainly due to the fact that they represents a lesser incurred cost in pension and 
health benefits related to the seniority
62
. In fact, net of these benefits, the overall benefits 
among these three categories would result quite similar. However migrant households receive 
on average, even if to a lesser disparity than natives, more benefits in terms of family 
allowances, unemployment benefits, education and housing allowances
63
. 
 
Although the report analyzed above examined the fiscal impact of migration at household 
average level, claiming that immigrant households in general have a positive impact on the 
public budget, is also interesting to investigate what is the fiscal impact of this type of 
population overall. Even in this case it is possible to estimate net contributions
64
, but 
analyzing the overall net contributions of migrant population intended as the difference 
between revenues and expenditures of the Public Budget related to immigrant resident 
population. 
 
One of more recent studies that estimates the overall fiscal impact of migration is the report of 
Banca d’Italia (2009) which uses data collected from Eu-Silc 2006 and Banca d’Italia 
surveys. In this regard, Banca d’Italia considers in the revenues side of the Italian Public 
Budget Irpef, VAT, excise duties, social contributions and Irap, whereas in the expenditures 
side expenses on education, health, pension benefits and expenditures on income support, 
taking into consideration overall the 70% of possible revenues and the 60% of possible 
expenses. The report shows that migrant contribute positively to the Public Budget of about 
10.6 billion €65. In addition, over a share of 5% of total presence in Italy, only 4% of migrants 
contribute to the State Budget and only 2,5% of them are social transfer recipient. 
Furthermore, the average tax return of migrants is lower than that of natives in accordance 
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 rather than EU migrant and italian households. 
62
 Old-age pensions and health costs. 
63
 This latter referred to costs  related to house, rent or loan for the purchase of a house. This item is greater for 
non-EU migrant than EU migrant households. 
64
 Expressing net contributions as the difference between contribution paid and benefits received. 
65
 With revenues of about 20 billion and expenses of about 10 billion. 
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with the lower earnings gained. Expenses relative to foreigners are too lower than that of 
natives, because migrants, even if they have education cost similar to that of natives, generate 
fewer significant outlays in health and pension sectors. 
However the analysis shows an excessively high overall net contribution. for this reason there 
is the need to check whether, from another analysis of this type emerges a similar result. 
 
In this regard it is interesting to recall the report of Idos (2015), which estimates the fiscal 
impact of foreign citizens resident in Italy in 2013, using data from various sources
66
, but 
mainly from MEF and Istat-Rcfl. To measure this impact, we first distinguish State Budget 
revenues into six categories listed below, for each of which Idos computes different 
assumptions. 
1. Irpef, the first item analyzed, presents some difficulties on the estimation. 
According to MEF, in 2013 3.5 million of foreign-born submitted individual 
income tax return
67, with a stated income equal to € 45.6 billion overall and a tax 
return of about € 6.74 billion. In the same year the average stated income per 
capita is equal to 13.181€ and the main source of income comes from dependent 
employment. However Idos-Unar has further elaborated
68
 these data in order to 
obtain information about foreign citizens, since these two categories refer to two 
types of population that are not perfectly coincident
69
. 
Based on Istat data, are then estimated the number of contributors of foreign 
citizenship comparing the number of foreign employees
70
 with the average income 
declared by foreign born of the same origin country, and obtaining an amount of 
about 2.3 million of contributors of foreign citizenship, with the equivalent income 
taxes declared of about 26.1 billion €. However, of about 2.3 million on them, only 
1.4 billion of foreign citizens are liable to pay Irpef, according to some Mef ratios, 
for an overall amount of about 3.2 billion €.  
2. Tax on consumption. Assuming that the 90% of the overall income of foreigners 
is used
71
and that the average tax rate is equal to 6.2%, is estimated an average tax 
of about 1.5 billion €. 
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 That will be described afterwards. 
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 Equal to the 8.6% of total taxpayers in Italy. 
68
 because they are estimated on the basis of foreign-born category which results to be very different from the 
category of our interest, foreign citizens. 
69
 excluding in this way those persons born in other countries which could have Italian citizenship from the 
database. 
70
 2.4 million in 2013. 
71
 10% is intended to remittances to origin countries, rents, mortgages, and other items not subject to VAT. 
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3. Oil mineral tax. Based on Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport, in 2013 there 
are 3 million of foreigners that hold a car. Assuming a mineral oil tax average 
equal to 300€ per capita, is estimated an amount of 930 million € for the mineral 
oil tax. 
4. Lotto and lotteries. Assessing an average of 5€ monthly for 3.8 million of adult 
foreigners, is achieved an overall amount equal to 230 million €. 
5. Annual tax from the renewal or issuance of residence permits. Considering an 
average tax of 200€ per capita with an amount of about 1.5 million of residence 
permits renewed/issued in 2013, it is estimated an amount equal to 300 million € 
overall. However in this item there is the necessity to consider also revenues tax 
that come from naturalizations. Considering that in 2013 acquisitions of 
citizenship are equal to 100 thousand and assuming a per capita cost equal to 200€, 
there is an additional revenues of 20 million €, for a total amount of 320 million €. 
6. The total tax revenues that comes from items described above amount to 6.1 
billion €, on which must be added social security contributions because, even if 
represents a provision for the worker, in the short term will support the public 
purse
72. Based on MEF, Istat and Inps data, assuming a tax burden equal to 4.294€ 
for both employer and employee with 2.4 million of foreigners employed, results 
an estimation equal to 10.5 billion € for social security contributions. 
 
Therefore, adding up all items described above, immigrants make contributions of about 16.6 
billion € to the Public Budget in 2013. 
Then, we distinguish State Budget expenditures related to migrant population into six 
categories, through the standard cost approach
73
method of estimation.  
1. Public health. In this sector, where the majority of this expense is targeted to the 
elderly population, the demographic composition of migrants reflects the lower use 
of health care services. With a postulated incidence of about 3.5% 
74
of migrants on 
the total expenditures of 109 billion €, the cost attributed to foreigners results to be 
equal to 3.9 billion €. 
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 We will discuss this matter in the third chapter. 
73
 Standard cost approach estimates the average of each expenditures of providing goods/services to immigrants, 
subtracting from each overall category costs the incidence of migrant population relative to that cost. The overall 
cost of each item is drawn from the “Relazione della Corte dei Conti sui rendiconti generali dello stato”. 
However this approach is not used for the monetary transfers estimation item. 
74
 This incidence comes from the Agenzia Sanitaria nazionale on the percentange of hospital admissions 
attribuitable to migrant population. 
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2. Public education. Since the foreign students in the school year 2012/2013 amount 
to 8.8% of total students, it follows an expense of about 3.6 billion €. However this 
sector has a structure and dynamic on which costs for public employee amount to 
over the 90% of the total cost, compared with expenditures for health public 
employees which amount to 32% of total cost. 
3. The item related to local and social service totally amount on 7 billion €. Inside 
this category there are different services as those intended to senior citizens, 
disabled people, family and their children, income support, social exclusion, 
service intended to migrants and so on. This latter service includes all those 
services for the social integration of foreigners, such as reception facilities, Italian 
language courses and cultural intermediaries with an incidence of about 8.5% on 
the overall expenses of this item, reaching an amount equal to 600 million €. 
4. Housing allowances. In the recent years this type of item linked to migrant 
population has given rise to many controversies due to the public opinion that 
immigrants have more rights than natives to reside in public housing. This is 
mainly due to a dual reason: on the one hand whereas the public housing heritage 
appears to be rather small compared to the European average, on the other side 
whereas about 20% of natives and 80% of immigrants live in rented 
accommodation, the share of people who requires support the public is greater 
among immigrants
75
. According to Federcasa estimates, housing expenditures 
related to foreign citizens is equal to 400 million €. 
5. Justice. This item covers expenses related to courts and prisons. With an incidence 
of migrants equal to 25% on the total expenditures, the cost associated to them 
amounts to 1.9 million €. However this sector, as education, has a structure and 
dynamic on which the majority of expenses related to justice is referred to public 
employees. 
6. Ministry of Interior item covers expenditures related to immigrant detention, 
reception centers and public order costs and includes also resources that comes 
from the EU
76
. Altogether expenses referred to migrant population was estimated 
of about 1 million €, with the higher amount which bound to the management of 
refugees
77
. 
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 For this reason some municipalities introduce some measures related to “anzianità di residenza” necessary to 
gain access to public housing. One example is the municipality of Padua, which recently increases the minimum 
threshold to 20 years of residence. 
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 Namely Fai and Fsi which amounts to 53 million € in 2013. 
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 Cda, Cara, Sprar, Sispa, Cie. 
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7. Monetary transfers. This item covers those transfers intended to income support 
as Cig, mobility grants and unemployment, family allowances which this latter 
amount to 1.2 billion € in 2013, and old-age benefits. Since in this year migrant 
over-65 population is equal to 130 thousands, the total transfer addressed is equal 
to 9 million €78. 
 
Table 2.4. Overall Revenues and Expenditures of Italian Budget relative to migrant 
population (in billion of €) with standard cost approach, 2013 
 
Source: Idos and Fondazione Leone Moressa elaborations on Mef and Istat data 
 
As shown in the Table 2.4, net contributions of migrant resident population to the Italian State 
Budget are positive and equal to 3.1 billion of € overall. Examining the individual items of 
Revenues of State Budget relative to migrant population, the highest contributions comes 
from social security contributions, with an amount equal to 10.5 billion € in 2013. However 
this item has to be considered only in the short run since only for a certain phase this type of 
contribution could be used to finance the Public Purse
79
. The amount of this item results to be 
higher than all of other components because, even if the majority of migrant population works 
in low-skilled with underpaid employments, the relative activity rate is then higher than that 
of native population owing to the different demographic composition. The second relevant 
item of revenues is Irpef with a sum equal to 3.2 billion €. This type of contribution if 
compared with that of native population results to be limited, probably due to lower wages, as 
mentioned above, but also due to the large percentage of migrants working in the black 
market or that not fully declare what actually receives. 
On the expenditures side, the highest expenditures comes from the health item. However in 
this case is necessary to specify that over the overall expenditures in public health of 109 
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 The overall over 65 population is equal to 16 million in 2013. 
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 Instead the impact in the long run will be discussed in the third chapter. 
Irpef 3.2 Health 3.9
V.A.T 1.5 Education 3.6
Mineral oil tax 0.9 Social services 0.6
Lotto and lotteries 0.2 Housing 0.4
Permits and citizenship tax 0.3 Justice 1.9
Total tax revenues 6.1 Ministry of Interior 1.0
Social security contributions 10.5 Monetary transfers 2.1
Total Revenues 16.6 Total Expenditures 13.5
Net contributions: +3.1 
Revenues Expenditures
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billion € in 2013, the share relative to migrant population is only 3.5%. This smaller amount 
probably comes from a predominantly young and healthy migrant population than that of 
native. But migrants could have also some obstacles as communication difficulties or in 
carrying out the administrative-bureaucratic procedures foe access to health services and so 
on, that could reduce the access to the Italian health system. The second relevant expenditures 
item is the public education with 3.2 billion €. In this case is necessary to notice that, even if 
migrant population affects considerably this item
80
, education is the sector where the public 
employees costs are preponderant
81
, and this could justify this large amounts resulting from 
this method of estimation. The third relevant item of expenditures regards the direct monetary 
transfer equal to 2.1 billion €.  
This item covers social security spending that, with 130 thousands of over 65 migrants in 
2013, is equal to 900 million €. However this subheading is likely to increase in the next years 
due to the higher share of over 65 migrant population. Furthermore this item covers also 
family allowances and transfers for income support on which foreign population affects 
particularly. 
 
Nevertheless, Idos (2015) highlights that the use of standard cost approach for the 
expenditures side could cause some overestimations. Since typically the incidence of public 
employees on the total public spending amounts to about 20% for each category considered
82
, 
the migrant average cost estimated for each category will include also those costs, influencing 
negatively that amount when the presence of public employees is very significant. One 
example is expenditures incurred by the Italian Budget for migrant population in education or 
justice sectors, where public employees incidence is of about 90% on total expenditures per 
item. For this reason could be more appropriate estimate expenditures through the marginal 
cost approach, which tries to estimates the effective incidence of new foreign resident citizens 
on the expenditures of pre-existent services. Considering the period between 2000 and 2013, 
the public expenditures seems to be increased of about 120 billion €, equal to 12 billion € per 
year. From these 12 billion, it is necessary to estimates how much of this increase is 
attributable to the foreign population. Since in that period the average incidence of foreigners 
was about 5% on the total population, it appears that the marginal increase associated to 
migrants doesn’t exceed the 600 million per year. However this amounts regards the overall 
expenditures of migrant population and not only the items analyzed above. In addition to 
                                                          
80
 Through the disadvantaged socio-economic conditions and the poor command of italian language. 
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 Over the 90% of overall education expenditures are allocated to public employees. 
82
 Since the total public expenditures is equal to 800 billion € in 2013, the cost associated to the public 
employees is equal to 163€ billion overall. 
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these expenses must be considered also the part of monetary transfers that remained 
unchanged because the relative estimates exempt from the standard cost approach, which 
amount of 2.6 billion € (Table 2.5). 
Idos (2015) further declares that, on the revenues side, to make a more accurate estimation of 
the fiscal impact of migration, is better to exclude social security contributions from the 
evaluation because social security contributions are considered as provision of deferred pay in 
the long run. In this case the net fiscal contribution of migrant resident population in Italy 
results to be positive and equal to 2.9 billion €. 
 
Table 2.5. Overall Revenues and Expenditures of Italian Budget refearred to migrant 
population (in billion of €) with marginal cost approach and omitting social 
contributions, 2013 
 
Source: Idos and Fondazione Leone Moressa elaborations on Mef and Istat data 
 
All reports reviewed shows that, despite these analysis not yet reached a complete and 
accurate estimation, immigrants contribute positively to the Italian Public Budget in the short 
term, even if with an incidence that not exceeds the 0.3% of GDP. This confirm the 
international analysis which predict that net migrant contributions never exceed the 0.5% of 
national GDP. 
The incidence of resident immigrants expenditures on total public expenditure appears to be 
very modest: 1.7% with the first method of calculation and 0.4% with the second. 
Furthermore, revenues and expenditures of the Government Budget are strongly conditioned 
by the fact that in Italy the migration phenomenon is quite recent and the first generation of 
them are in working age, representing almost entirely an active position in the labour market.  
  
Total tax revenues 6.1 Public spending 3.2
of which monetary transfers 2.6 *
of which marginal annual increase 0.6
Total Revenues 6.1 Total Expenditures 3.2
Net contributions: +2.9
* monetary transfers item is different from the prevoius value because here there are 500 millions of 
monetary trasfers refearred to housing policy sector and municipal social transfers that previously were 
accounted in other items
Revenues Expenditures
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2.3 Impact of migration at local level: the case of Lombardia 
 
As seen in the previous section, the fiscal impact of migration in Italy is positive, even if in an 
slight amount. Nevertheless, according to Pellizzari (2011) whose analyses the different 
probabilities of access to welfare state between EU/extra-EU migrant and native population in 
our country, crossing sample data with administrative data
83
, appears that extra-EU migrants 
are more likely to demand welfare services than EU migrants and natives.  
Considering that migrant population concentrates mainly in areas characterized by an higher 
demand of unskilled labour, they work in jobs that are comparatively less well paid than those 
hold by natives, affecting almost certainly the local welfare system more significantly than 
observable similar Italians. Hence if foreign population doesn’t represent an expense for the 
public finance nationally, could represents a burden at local level. As consequence is 
interesting to examine what is the fiscal impact of migrant population at regional level, 
distinguishing further the relative impact at citizenship level. 
Hence, the objective of this section is to analyze whose nationalities impact positively or 
negatively on the local budget of the region characterized by the highest share of foreign 
resident population with 1.3 million of individuals in 2013: Lombardia. 
 
Euròpolis (2015), based on 2013 ORIM data, estimates the fiscal impact of migrant 
population on this region adopting a static approach
84
 through the estimation of net 
contributions on the Regional Budget. For this estimation in the revenues side are considered 
Irpef, social contributions and VAT, whereas on the expenditures side are analyzed health, 
education and pension system
85
.  
Foreign residents in this region contribute positively to the regional budget overall, with an 
amount equal to about 33 million of €86, confirming results of researches reviewed in the 
previous section. 
Euròpolis developed a further analysis, decomposing the regional fiscal impact of 
immigration with respect to the first five nationalities living in this region, which represents 
the 46% of total migrant population residing in this region: Romanians (14.52%), Moroccans 
(9.67%), Albanians (9.51%), Egyptians (6.60%) and Chinese (5.27%). The objective of this 
                                                          
83
 Eu-Silc and Inps (ISEE) 2007. 
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 Estimation in a given year of net contributions of migrant population in Lombardia, that in this case are 
estimated overall. 
85
Estimated through the standard cost method. 
86
 With total revenues equal to 4.21 billion € and total expenditures equal to 4.18 billion €. Higher contributions 
comes from V.A.T (2.3 billion €) item whereas the higher benefits comes from education item (2.7 billion €). 
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distinction is to examine what is the impact of different migrant nationalities because, having 
different demographic characteristics, could influence the  regional budget in a different way. 
As shown in the Table 2.6 it is possible to split the fiscal impact of different nationalities in 
two groups according to the sign of regional budget balance. The fiscal impact of Romanians 
and Moroccans is negative with net overall contributions equal to -12.3 and -94.5 million of € 
respectively, whereas the contrary occurs for migrants who comes from Albania, Egypt and 
China with net contributions equal to +11, +74 and +133 million of €. The negative result 
depends mainly by the fact that the first two foreign nationalities represent a very incurred 
cost on the education item which is not adequately compensated by the tax return taken in 
question. The contrary instead occurs for the other three nationalities. 
 
Table 2.6. Revenues and Expenditures of Regional Budget related to the first five 
citizenships of migrant population residing in Lombardia (in million of €), 2013 
 
Source: CIFREL elaborations on ISTAT, ORIM, Eurostat and INPS data 
 
Chinese is citizenship that most contribute to the regional budget because declares much 
higher average incomes than other nationalities, thus contributing with very high Irpef tax and 
requesting lower welfare access to health and education system, offsetting in this way the 
negative balance of Moroccan immigrants, even if their share on the total migrant population 
in this region is the smallest (5.27%). In particular, comparing regional budget’s items of 
these two latter nationalities, which also represents the two opposite fiscal impact on regional 
Irpef 143.8 Health 149.8 Irpef 69.9 Health 101.6
Social security cont. 75.3 Pension 20.5 Social security cont. 102.8 Pension 13.7
V.A.T 307.7 Education 368.7 V.A.T 190.8 Education 342.8
Total Rev. 526.7 Total Exp. 539.1 Total Rev. 363.5 Total Exp. 458.1
Net contributions: -12.3 Net contributions: -94.5
Irpef 107.9 Health 108.6 Irpef 91.5 Health 68.2
Social security cont. 73.0 Pension 13.5 Social security cont. 50.4 Pension 9.3
V.A.T 195.8 Education 243.4 V.A.T 186.9 Education 176.3
Total Rev. 376.7 Total Exp. 365.5 Total Rev. 328.7 Total Exp. 253.8
Net contributions: +11.2 Net contributions: +74.9
Irpef 108.4 Health 51.3 Irpef 521.5 Health 479.5
Social security cont. 77.3 Pension 7.4 Social security cont. 378.8 Pension 64.4
V.A.T 116.0 Education 109.5 V.A.T 997.2 Education 1240.8
Total Rev. 301.7 Total Exp. 168.2 Total Rev. +1897.4 Total Exp. 1784.7
Net contributions: +133.5 Net contributions: +112.7
Chinese First five citizenships
Revenues Expenditures Revenues Expenditures
Albanians Egyptians
Revenues Expenditures Revenues Expenditures
Romanians Moroccans
Revenues Expenditures Revenues Expenditures
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budget, it is interesting to underline which demographic characteristics (at individual and at 
household level) generates differences among these items, rather than the only difference in 
share of foreign nationals in Lombardia that not always affect these values. 
For the Irpef item for example, appears that difference in the amount is caused by difference 
in individual average income (569€ Moroccans versus 831€ Chinese monthly), in household 
composition (3.48 Moroccans versus 2.97 Chinese), in labour market participation suggested 
by household average income(1.032€ Moroccans versus 1.594 € Chinese) and in the share of 
individuals paying Irpef on total migrants of same nationalities (30% Moroccans and 46% 
Chinese). For VAT item, values diverge mainly by the difference in incidence on total 
migrant population in this region (9.67% Moroccans versus 5.27% Chinese) but also by 
different household composition. In fact Moroccans which are characterized by larger 
households, results that pay higher VAT than Chinese households. For social security 
contributions’ differences, appears that in this case the share of a nationality influence in a 
consistent way on the amount of this item. In fact even if Moroccans pay on average 1.051€ 
per month compared with the 1.451€ of Chinese for social security contributions, the amount 
of Moroccans appears to be higher than this latter nationality. 
Considering the expenditures side, disparity on health items arises mainly from the difference 
on average age (35 for Moroccans versus 34 for Chinese) causing, even if appears only a 
small age difference, an expense per capita of about 1.039€ yearly for the larger nationality 
and 962€ for the smaller nationality.  
The pension system item covers benefits on assistance, income support and old 
age/invalidity/survivors but in this case Euròpolis doesn’t have available data per citizenship. 
According to INPS data which provides information distinguishing pension expenditures for 
EU and extra EU foreigners overall, appears that even if extra-EU foreigners are more welfare 
recipients than others (14.353 versus 3.172), they receive on average lower amounts (8.071€ 
versus 10.678€ yearly and per-capita)87. In this case, analyzing differences on pension items 
of two extra-EU countries, we can say that these distinctions depend especially by the share of 
each nationality, as occurs for social security contributions described above. 
Furthermore, with regard to education item, distinguishing expenditures per education level
88
 
appears that whereas educational expenditures stand out for the average number of cohabitant 
underage children (0.97 Moroccans versus 0.61 Chinese) with expenditures equal to 3.500€ 
for Moroccans and 2.035 for Chinese
89
, tertiary expenditures differences depends on number 
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 In this region, about 53% migrant recipients of pension system receive benefits on assistance, rather than on 
old age and income support. 
88
 Educational (from primary school to upper secondary school) and tertiary expenditures. 
89
 Intended as annual per capita education expenditures. 
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of enrollments, without necessarily evident linkages with the number of adult children 
cohabiting. In this regard appears that young Chinese are more enrolled in academic world 
than young Moroccans. 
 
Finally, the fiscal impact of migration at regional level examined confirms what was said at 
national level, namely that migrant population contribute positively on the Public Budget 
overall. However this impact, both positive and negative, stands out on nationalities. This 
evidence is largely caused by the different demographic characteristics of each migrant 
nationality, instead of the UE/ extra-UE origin as sustained by Pellizzari (2011). In fact, 
taking in consideration the two extra-EU nationalities which impact on the local budget in the 
opposite way, Moroccans and Chinese, appears that the worst fiscal impact was sired by 
Moroccans and most positive impact by Chinese migrants. On that note, raises the question 
whether Chinese population represents a solution to solve economic, financial and 
demographic problems or not. In this regard is important to highlight that, despite the great 
entrepreneurship of Chinese population, arises frequent instances of illegality. Just think of 
numerous poor working conditions inside those companies managed by Chinese citizens, with 
laboratories as dormitories, abusive kitchens, irregular labour force and tax avoidance. For 
this reason, notwithstanding results and according to Gabriele (2012), there is a clear 
necessity to adopt three types of measure in particular: 1) measures to combat irregular labour 
market, in order to ensure the payment of taxes and contributions; 2) measures to facilitate the 
establishment and integration of each migrant and his families in order to allow the creation of 
favorable conditions for the procreation; 3) a measure to sustain the development of human 
capital, especially for second generations, in order to have the possibility to labour market 
access with better skills and to ensure a more consistent contribution to public finance . 
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CHAPTER 3. THE CONTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS TO 
THE ITALIAN PENSION SYSTEM 
 
3.1 Actual pension system in Italy and the sustainability of migrant population 
 
In 2014, the Italian total general government revenues were estimated equal to €776 billion 
(48% of GDP), whereas the total general government expenditures equal to €825 billion (51% 
of GDP), with a deficit equal to €48 billion (-3% of GDP) and general government gross debt 
equal to €2.137 billion (131.9% of GDP).  
According to the OECD (2015), Italy is the country that spend in terms of GDP the largest 
proportion of national income on public pensions among OECD countries with a rate equal to 
16,5% of GDP (€267 billion)90, preceded only by Greece with a rate equal to 17.1% in terms 
of GDP, whereas is in last place on education investments
91
.  
 
Figure 3.1. Italian total pension expenditures over the years (billion of €)
 
Source: our elaborations on Eurostat database 
 
As seen in the Figure 3.1.however, the overall pension expenditures has grown rapidly over 
the years, switching from €210 billion in 2005 (14.1% of GDP) to €268 billion in 2014 
(16.5% of GDP). This growth, if analyzed from the contribution revenues that fund pension 
system and cash outflows intended to pensions point of view, depends on a number of 
                                                          
90
Data comes from Eurostat database. In particular public pension covers the old age benefits for 11.6% on GDP 
(€187 billion) and survivors benefits for 2.7% on GDP, whereas all other benefits affect GDP only for the 2.1%. 
91
 Education investment is stable and equal to 65.5 billion of  € per year, namely the 4.1% of GDP. 
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reasons, that in this elaboration are broken down in legislative, demographic, economic and 
financial terms. 
 
In legislative terms, the slowness on transition from earnings-based scheme to contribution-
based scheme introduced by Dini Reform in 1995, further increase the pension expenditure. In 
particular in a pay-as-you-go system (PAYG), where actual active generation provides 
through the social security contributions for the funding of retirement age generations, this 
leads to a very supported spending on the current younger generations. In this respect, in 2012 
was introduced Fornero Reform
92
 with the objective to reduce the pension expenditure and to 
improve the generational equity (applying contributive-based scheme to all retirees from 2012 
and a mixed scheme to those retirees whose in 31/12/1995 already accumulated 18 years of 
contributions). 
In demographic terms, the lengthening of life expectancy (20.4 years at 65years people) and 
the reduction of births creates an extension on administration period of pensions and an 
increase of aging population rising as consequence the pension expenditures and reducing the 
active population which could sustain this type of public spending. 
In economic terms, instead, the increase of the unemployment rate together with the 
introduction of new flexible forms of work reduce the contribution base and the national 
payroll necessary to funding pensions.  
In financial terms, the disparity among the resources obtained to finance the pension system 
and the total pension expenditures requires the government intervention in a time of deep 
financial crisis, increasing as consequence the State Budget deficit. 
 
According to problems described above, immigrant population could represent a solution to 
sustain the pension system. In fact, in demographic terms for example, the foreign population 
who decides to reside in Italy can mitigate imbalances resulting from aging population 
through both its earliest age (34 foreigner versus 46 native years old on average) and its 
highest fertility rate (1.97 foreigner versus 1.29 native children average per woman). In 
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 In particular, the reform requires the contribution-based system in the calculation of pension for all workers, 
even those who - as a result of the Dini reform of 1995 - were building their own retirement with the more 
generous compensation system. The pension is thus based on the payments made by the employee and employer 
and not the last earned salary. Simultaneously, the Fornero reform has raised the retirement age of men and 
women, establishing the conditions for the "old age pension" (according the chronologic age):at least 20 years of 
contributions and 66 years for women and men in the public service (public and private sector), 62 years for 
women in the private sector (then 66 years and 3 months in 2018), 63 years and 6 months for self-employed 
women (which will gradually become 66 years and 3 months in 2018). Also it abolishes the "retirement pension" 
(based on the number of years of work) replaced by "early retirement pension": today one must have worked 41 
years and 3 months for women or 42 years and 3 months for men. In addition, the reform provides for the 
periodic adjustment of retirement requirements elongation of life expectancy. 
55 
 
addition, in the absence of migration, Centro Studi Confindustria (2016) confirms that Italian 
population would have been reduced by 132 thousand of units from 2003 to 2016 due to 
negative natural balance. 
 
Figure 3.2. Resident population in Italy with and without migrant population  
 
Source: CSC elaborations on Istat data 
 
Instead, because of new foreign arrivals and their relative higher number of births (75.000 
births versus 5.000 death toll) in the same period foreigners increased the Italian resident 
population of about 5 million, achieving 60.7 million overall in 2016. It also possible to 
observe that migrant population contribute to sustain demographic imbalances through the 
old-age dependency ratio
93
. In fact according to CSC estimation (2016), in 2015 old age 
dependency ratio was equal to 33.7% and in the absence of migrant population this ratio 
would have resulted higher of 3.3 percentage points. Furthermore, migrant population affect 
mainly the working age population (15-64), accounting for 4 million of people in 2015
94
.  
In economic terms instead, since migrant population has higher employment rate than Italians 
(58% versus 55%) could represents an advantage, increasing through their workforce the 
contribution base and the national payroll.  
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 Ratio between the number of over 65 and working age (15-64) population. 
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In this regard, migrant population represents the 10% on the total italian working age population. 
52.000.000 
53.000.000 
54.000.000 
55.000.000 
56.000.000 
57.000.000 
58.000.000 
59.000.000 
60.000.000 
61.000.000 
62.000.000 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
With Foreigners Without Foreigners 
56 
 
In legislative terms instead, in a PAYG system which is slowly switching to the contribution-
based scheme, actual working age generation still transfers resources to retirees. Considering 
that immigrants prevail in the working age group, through their integration in the labour 
market they can help to alleviate the tax burden of actual working-age generation, increasing 
the tax base used to finance pensions. In fact, as seen in the 2.2 chapter, foreign residents paid 
social contributions for an amount equal to 10.5 billion of € in 2013, and 10.9 billion of € in 
2014. 
 
Table 3.3. Estimation of social security contributions of migrant workers in Italy  
 
Source:  FLM elaborations on MEF and Istat data 
 
According to FLM (2016), allocating the overall migrant social security contributions paid in 
2014 to the average pension income (17.031€), results that migrant regular workers finance 
pension to 640.000 native retirees. Furthermore, adding up all the social security contributions 
paid in the last five years, and taking into account the evolution of tax rate over these years, it 
is possible to say that immigrants from 2009 to 2014 paid € 56.58 billion in contributions, a 
sufficient amount for a budgetary maneuver. 
Nevertheless, since migrant population is younger than natives, it registers very small 
retirement flows than these latter (130.000 migrant over 65 versus 12 million Italians in 
2013). In fact, considering the relationship between the social contributions paid (€ 10.5 
billion) and pension expenditures provided (€ 900 million)95 by/to migrant residents, it reveals 
that migrant population contributes 12 times more than the amount claimed by them to 
pension system.  
                                                          
95
 Amount estimated by Fondazione Leone Moressa on Mef and Istat data. 
Year
Number of 
migrants 
employed
Incidence on 
total employed 
(%)
Social 
contributions paid 
(billion of €)
Incidence on 
total social 
contributions 
(%)*
Number of retirees 
which receive pension 
through immigrant 
contributions**
2009 1.790.000 7.9 7.92 3.7 520.000
2010 1.910.000 8.5 8.47 4.0 550.000
2011 2.030.000 9.0 9.28 4.3 580.000
2012 2.110.000 9.3 9.72 4.5 600.000
2013 2.180.000 9.8 10.29 4.8 620.000
2014 2.290.000 10.3 10.90 5.0 640.000
56.58
* Incidence was understimated because social contributions covers other transfers in addition to pensions 
** Number of retirees means number of pension income paid with foreign worker contributions. This result was obtained 
dividing total migrant contributions with average pension income, provided by Istat.
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In this respect it should however be noted that, according to INPS chairman Tito Boeri, in 
Italy there are some immigrants who paid social contributions without requiring it when they 
return to origin country, leaving an amount equal to almost €3 billion per year96. 
 
From these considerations, it is possible to say that currently migrant population provides a 
positive support to Italian pension system, sustaining part of Public expenditures for native 
pensions and contributing to alleviate the rigidity of the budgetary constraint. However it is 
important to highlight that part of migrant workers are employed in irregular conditions or in 
lower skilled jobs. If foreign population had higher education level or there were more 
stringent rules against the black labor market, it is clear that foreign population bring broader 
social security contributions and thus even a further positive support to the Italian pension 
system. 
 
3.2 Retirement flows of immigrant resident: estimation in the medium term 
 
In accordance with the previous section, resident migrant population is providing an 
important contribution to the Italian pension system repairing the relationship between retirees 
and active workers in the labour market, that until now is heavily weighted in favour of the 
former. However, this benefits cannot last forever, because also migrant population sooner or 
later are intended to aging. In this respect, a research developed by Marinaro (2014)
97
 makes 
predictions on the immigrants access to the pension system during the 2010-2025 period
98
. 
Although the 2012 pension reform initially requires the retirement after the age of 66 for men 
and 65 for women, since this not constitute stringent constraints, the author hypnotized that 
men/women start to claim their pension at 65 years old. According to that estimation, whereas 
in 2010 the overall Italian population was equal to 60 million of which the 93.7% by Italians 
and 6.9% (4 million) by foreigners, the over 65 population was equal to about 12 million, of 
which the 99.2% by Italians (12 million) and the 0.8% by foreigners. (98.000). According to 
Istat predictions, fifteen years later Italian population will reach 65 million of people, 
composed by the 87.7% by Italians and the 12.3% by foreigners (8 million). In the years 
following the 2010 it is expected that over 65 population will increase of 1 million every 5 
years, reaching in 2015 an amount equal to 16 million of people in retirement age, composed 
for 97.1% (15 million) by Italians and 2.9% (452.000) by foreigners.  
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This probably occurs for the lack of adequate information or for bureaucratic problems. 
97
 Marinaro R. in European Migration Network, 2014. 
98
 This study was analysed after the introduction of Fornero law. 
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Table 3.4. Average retirement flows of immigrant and native residents in Italy, (2010-
2025) 
 
Source: our elaborations on EMN (2014) 
 
A shown in the Table 3.4, during the 2011-2015 period, average retirement flows reach an 
amount equal to 15.000 for foreigners and 672.000 for natives yearly, for an overall amount 
during the five-year period equal to 75.000 for foreigners and 3 million for natives in 
retirement age. In the period 2016-2020 instead, the average retirement flows will achieve 
27.000 for foreigners and 711.000 for natives yearly, reaching in the five-year period an 
amount equal to 135.000 for foreigners and about 3 million for natives overall. In the last 
five-year period, the average retirement flows will be equal to 43.000 for immigrants and 
745.000 for natives yearly, achieving in that period about 213.000 foreigners and 4 million of 
natives in retirement age overall. 
As shown in the last column of the Table 3.4, it is possible to observe the so-called 
“differenziale pensionistico”, understood as how many Italians are in retirement age for every 
immigrant in the same age condition. In the first five-year period, arises that 1 migrant every 
46 natives enter in the retirement age; in the second five-year period 1 every 27 and in the last 
five-year period 1 every 19. 
From this analysis it is possible to sustain the fact that since migrant population is on average 
younger than native population also during this estimated period (2010-2025), until 2025 
immigrants will impact on the pension system only marginally, still helping as consequence to 
sustain the Italian pension system. However considering that “differenziale pensionistico” will 
gradually decrease over the years, even the contribution that foreigners give to the Italian 
pension system will gradually running out. 
 
Entrances per 
year
Overall 
entrance in the 
five-year period
"Differenziale 
pensionistico"*
Foreigners: 15.000 75.354
Natives: 672.000 3.360.000
Foreigners: 27.000 135.000
Natives: 711.000 3.555.000
Foreigners: 43.000 212.658
Natives: 745.000 3.725.000
* Frequency of possible foreigners candidates for pension relative to natives. This value comes from the 
relationship between the overall entrances of foreigners and natives during the five-year period
2011-2015
2016-2020
2021-2025
Period covered
1 every 46
1 every 27
1 every 19
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In an article published by La Stampa in 2016, are developed further forecasts of pension 
retirement flows, crossing the demographic forecasts with studies on social security spending 
forecasts. This analysis shows that the 2030 will be the “zero year, namely the year on which 
will enter in the retirement age the so-called baby boomers
99
, after having achieved the 66-67 
years old. In that year hence, will be a peak of retirement demand which will create a shock to 
the Italian pension system
100
. According to Blangiardo (2016) from 2030 the situation will be 
further exacerbated by what he calls the “invecchiamento importato” effect, because he 
estimated that during that year will retire about 200 million of migrants per year. This amount 
is very different from the estimates made above, because Blangiardo says that many 
immigrants who were in retirement age before, didn’t enter into pension as that they may have 
started to pay contributions only later
101
.  
 
Returning to retirement flows, there are still many doubts today about the possible costs / 
benefits of immigrants on the national budget if they decide to stay in Italy or return to the 
motherland after retirement. In this regards exists three different choice’s hypothesis that 
they could adopt. The first hypothesis sustain that migrant population, after the retirement 
remain the settlement country.  
To confirm this assumption there is a study developed by Lunaria (2013) with regard to 2010 
on which shows that the 76.6% of foreign-born pensions were delivered in Italy, whereas only 
the 23.4% in other countries. The second hypothesis sustain that migrat population, after the 
pension achievement, return in the origin country maintaining the destination country 
citizenship in order to have the access to all public services in the case of necessity, as health 
service for example. In these two first hypothesis hence, there will be a saving for Italian 
country because immigrants can make use of all possible public services available. On the 
contrary the third theory sustain that immigrants after a certain period on which stays in the 
settlement country, they will return in the origin country, creating a sort of “temporary 
migration”. This theory was sustained by Dustmann (2015) on which he wanted to show that 
about the 50% of immigrants settled in Europe leave the territory after 10 years
102
. Dustmann 
sustain that although there are strong empirical evidences, currently available studies have not 
taken into consideration this hypothesis due to lack of available data. However, the driving 
forces that affect immigrant decision to stay only for a certain period in the country of 
                                                          
99
 People born between 1964 and 1965 reaching 1 million of births  in those years. 
100
 This shock was estimated to last until 2035, when the contribution-based system will be completely 
introduced improving that situation. 
101
 For example because they became regular worker only in old age (40 years old). 
102
 Whereas those settled in other continents the percentage decrease to 20% of immigrants. 
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settlement are manifold
103
. However the temporariness decrease the amount of contributions 
that a migrant can pay in the settlement country. The lower propensity of immigrants to invest 
in human capital, as language training; generates lower earnings and therefore they pay lower 
direct taxes and social contributions. In addition, because of lower wages, they tend to replace 
the leisure with working time (increasing the participation rate to the labour market), thus 
reducing consumptions and as consequence indirect taxes, allocating the gains mainly in 
remittances. Temporariness however reduces the costs for the immigrant population because 
being that immigrants decide to stay only for a certain period of their working age, they do 
not represent a cost which is what represent people of retirement age. In particular 
temporariness represents a benefits in terms of welfare services costs overall. In pension 
expenditure instead temporariness creates twofold opposite impact. While the temporary 
nature generates savings in terms of average amounts to be paid in the form of pensions to 
immigrants
104
, on the other hand however, it generates costs as immigrants are still entitled to 
a pension. In this latter case in fact, INPS underlines that in case of permanent return to the 
origin country
105
, the immigrant reserves all pension rights and social security accrued in 
Italy, and he can benefit from these rights even if Italy did not strict bilateral agreements with 
the country of origin
106
. 
 
Going back to the previous retirement flows topic, despite Boeri says that in the short term 
immigrants make a contribution to the Italian pension system, Blangiardo instead says that is 
not possible make a simple reasoning cash in the short term. In fact, although in the short run 
foreigners make a positive contribution, in the long run the contributions that they have paid 
will be given back by right, together with other issue that we will discuss below.  
The Italian pension system characterized by the notional defined contribution system, the 
amount of pension benefits are directly related to social security contributions paid during 
working years. The fact that there will be an entrance of a growing number of subjects in old 
age (such as immigrants) who, due to contributive breaks mainly due to an unstable labor 
market and to a strong use of flexible working contracts, will be able to count only on a 
modest contribution for pension purposes, they will receive very low pension benefits. This 
in turn implies that immigrants, after helping to finance the pensions of the natives, are likely 
                                                          
103
 Some immigrants could decide to remain in the settlement country only for the time necessary to collect 
human capital considered fundamental in the origin country. Other migrants could decide to stay in the country 
only until they reach a predetermined amount established at the beginning of economic migration.  
104
 Due to lower contributions and hence lower pension amount per individual. 
105
 Both EU and non-EU country 
106
 However, as pointed in the INPS site, these benefits can be perceived only after achieving the 66 years, even 
if even without having reached 20 years of contributions. 
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to run into difficult situations such as the poverty risk, burden on any additional forms of 
Italian public welfare.  
 
Unfortunately there are no analyzes relating to poverty risk of migrants after retirement for 
the Italian case, but it is possible to take as a reference the results from a similar analysis for 
Denmark
107
. In fact, according to this study, the poverty risk of over 50 immigrants which 
come from four countries outside the OECD (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Vietnam) is very high 
compared to natives. In the case of Denmark this is because in that country to enjoy the full 
board, an individual must reside in the territory for at least 40 years and still be fully 
integrated into the labor market in order to be able to pay higher social security contributions. 
In Italy you can say such a thing taking account of the above considerations of our social 
security system and therefore the risk that immigrants once they enter into retirement come in 
poverty is very high in Italy. 
 
After establishing that in Italy there will be an increase in the risk of poverty for all those 
individuals who once entered in retirement will receive a minimum pension, it is interesting to 
analyze how an individual already in precarious situations sees their standard of living change 
in the moment that he ceases to work. This is possible by the net pension replacement rate 
which, through the relationship  between the individual net pension entitlement and the net 
pre-retirement earnings
108
, estimates in percentage terms how much of the last earnings of 
working age receive in terms of pension benefit (or how much he loses). According to OECD 
data refer to 2014, the net pension replacement rate for those who have an average worker 
earnings (AW) about half that of the Italian average
109
, as for the majority of immigrants, is 
equal to 82.2%, against the 79.7 % referred to those who have an AW equal to the Italian 
average.  
The net pension replacement rate referred to immigrant population therefore, if compared 
with the poverty risk of the same, might suggest that despite the increasing trend of poverty 
once immigrants enter into retirement, these individuals see further worsen their living 
standards "only" 18.8% of the earnings they received working age, compared with a reduction 
of 20.3% for those who have an AW equal to the Italian average. Overall, the fact that this 
rate is high is mainly due to the recent pension interventions by raising the retirement age and 
the years of mandatory contribution to retire. Without this intervention the Net pension 
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 Jakobsen and Pedersen (2016). 
108
 Taking into account personal income taxes and social security contributions paid by workers and pensioners. 
109
 In 2014 the italian AW was of about 30.463€. 
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replacement rate would be reduced over time, due to the shift from an overly generous system 
(such as salary) to a less generous system (the contributory)
110
. 
 
In conclusion, based on the methods described above, the retirement flows of immigrants 
until 2025 are still small quantities due to the younger average age of immigrants than natives. 
It is not clear however what will be the advantages or disadvantages if an individual once 
came to the retirement decides to stay in Italy or return to their country of origin, although 
apparently seems that if he decide to move to the motherland will bring savings to the Italian 
constraint budget only in terms of spending on health and welfare services. Being that every 
immigrant working life has generally paid less contributions than any native, this implies that 
it will have a much reduced pension in the future. This in turn will increase poverty. There is 
therefore the need for the state to act in this matter in order to promote policies to reduce 
inequalities in the labor market, to encourage professional training, as well as to protect the 
pensions of low-paid workers. 
 
3.3 Effect of immigrants on the long run sustainability of the pension system 
 
As seen in the previous paragraph, Italy is one of the countries that spends most on pension 
expenditure in terms of GDP. 
Through to the analysis performed by RGS (2016) it is possible to analyze what are the 
medium-long term forecasts (2010-2060) in pension expenditure in terms of GDP, resulting 
from a combination of demographic component forecasts (fertility rate, life expectancy rate 
and net migration) and macroeconomic components forecasts (activity rate, unemployment 
rate, employment rate, national productivity and real GDP). 
The objective of this analysis is to verify how immigrants, being one of the demographic 
components considered, impact on pension expenditures in terms of GDP, through a 
sensitivity analysis.  
First of all it is necessary to start analyzing the demographic and macroeconomic predictions 
on the national baseline scenarios and the relative pension expenditures on GDP.  
The demographic component referred to Istat (2011) predictions, updated with predictions of 
Italian population at 1
st
 January 2015, considered hence as base year. Demographic 
predictions as shown in the table 3.5, are accounted as follows: fertility rate will achieve an 
average amount equal to 1.6 children per woman in 2060; life expectancy rate equal to 85.9 
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 Guttadauro (2015) on RGS 2014 estimations. 
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for men and 90.8 for women; net migration will achieve about 182 million of units in 2060 
(after the peak of 251 million of units in 2020).  
 
Table 3.5. Predictions and results of pesion expenditures in terms of GDP (2010-2060) 
with National baseline scenarios 
 
Source: RGS elaborations on Istat and Def data (2016) 
 
For the macroeconomic components predictions instead, the analysis referred to Def (2016) 
that are accounted as follows: activity rate for 15-64 age group will be equal to 70.2% in 
2060
111
; unemployment rate will be reduced in 2060 achieving an amount equal to 5.5%
112
; 
employment rate equal to 65.9% in 2060
113
; national productivity will increase to nearly 1.6 
in 2050 for then decrease by 0.1 percentage points during the next decade
114
; real GDP will be 
equal to 1.5% in 2060
115
.  
According to forecasts of demographic and macroeconomic components of the national 
baseline scenario, is possible to observe what will be the trend of pension expenditure in 
terms of GDP in the long run. In fact, as shown in the Figure 3.6, the trend in pension 
expenditure can be described by dividing this ratio into four periods:2000-2013, 2014-2029, 
2030–2044, 2045-2060. 
 
                                                          
111
 The increase of this rate during the 2015-2060 period is mainly due to both the growth in the participation rate 
of older workers is the increase in the female component in the labor market. In particular the first phenomenon 
comes from the exit postponement from the labor market due both to the raising of the retirement age and the 
relative contribution payments. 
112
 Until 2020 predictions say that this rate will increase reaching the peak of 9.6% for the increase to 7.4% in 
2030. 
113
 The trend in this rate comes from the change of macroeconomic indexes just analyzed above. 
114
The description of productivity estimation can be found on RGS 2016,  
115
 The average increase of real GDP comes mainly from the employment growth and the productivity growth. 
The inflation rate will be equal to 2% from 2020. 
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Fertility rate 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6
Life expectancy rate
Men 79.3 80.9 82.5 83.8 85.0 85.9
Women 84.3 85.9 87.5 88.8 89.9 90.8
Net migration (million) 200 251 220 206 194 182
Activity rate 15-64 (%) 62.0 63.7 67.1 69.9 70.4 70.2
Unemployment rate (%) 8.4 9.6 7.4 6.0 5.6 5.5
Employment rate 15-64 (%) 56.8 57.3 61.8 65.2 66.0 65.9
National productivity (%) -0.1 0.9 1.5 1.6 1.5
Real GDP (%) 0.3 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.5
Results of 
predictions
Pension expenditure on GDP (%) 14.8 15.2 15.0 15.3 15.0 13.7
Demographic 
componets
Macroeconomic 
components
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Figure 3.6. Pension expenditures on GDP with national baseline scenarios (%) 
 
Source: RGS (2016) 
 
In the first period, the ratio grown in intensity especially in the period 2008-2009 following 
the acute phase of the economic crisis. However even the in the subsequent five-years period 
the relationship continued to grow due to the negative performance of the GDP. In the second 
phase (2014-2029) the pension expenditures and GDP relationship will start to decrease until 
2029. This trend probably is the result of the combination of both the raising of the minimum 
requirements for access to the pension system and the application of the pro-rata contribution 
system. In this case the economic growth generated through the employment and productivity 
growth doesn’t seems to affect due to the offsetting of the first negative effect of demographic 
transition
116
. In the third period instead, the pension expenditures ratio will start to increase 
again due to the combination of the increase of the number of retirees of baby boom 
generation and the increase in life expectancy ratio even if this latter seems to be opposed by 
the higher minimum retirement requirements. The fact that baby boomers affect so much on 
pension expenditure lies in the fact that in this period will be entitled to retirement the last 
cohorts of people with mixed computing system and only at the end of this period will enter 
completely operative the contribution system. Finally, in the last period, it is expected that 
pension expenditure will start again to decrease due both to pensions completely liquidated 
with the contribution system, the adaptation of requirements of pension entitlement to the life 
expectancy of access and finally the reduction of the ratio between pensions on employed 
persons, this latter caused by the gradual elimination of the baby boom generations. 
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 During these years in fact the old age dependency ratio will increase due to the pension entrance of baby 
boomers. 
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Now, after describing the demographic and macroeconomic forecasts and the relative impact 
on pension expenditures on the national baseline scenarios, it is interesting to develop a 
sensitivity analysis in order to verify what components influence considerably on the pension 
expenditures. RGS (2016) developed two levels of sensitivity analysis. In the first level it 
analyzed the impact on the pension expenditures of two alternative demographic scenarios 
than that of national baseline (high and low scenarios) with the objective to verify what is the 
impact with an increase/ decrease of all demographic and macroeconomic components. In the 
second sensitivity level it analyzed the impact of each individual demographic  and 
macroeconomic component, with the objective to verify what components better improve the 
pension expenditures on GDP relationship. In this latter case it is also possible to understand 
if the variable of our interest, namely migrant variable, affects in a consistent manner on this 
relationship. However in both levels, all parameter changes will be applied from 2016. 
 
For the first level sensitivity analysis the high scenarios will have all components increased 
than the national baseline scenario components in this way: 
 Increase of net migration of 40.000 per year on average, equal to 20.000 units per year 
in the initial period of the forecast and about 60,000 units per year in the final period.  
 Increase of the fertility rate of 0.20 children per woman in 2060. 
 Increase of life expectancy rate to 1.9 years for men and 2.3 years for women in the 
final period of the estimation 
The low scenarios instead, will have an opposite variation sign than the high scenarios and 
will not be perfectly symmetrical to this latter. In fact, it is expected a decrease of 
demographic components respect to demographic components of national baseline scenarios 
for:  
 Reduction of net migration of 40.000 per year on average, equal to 20.000 units per 
year in the initial period of the forecast and about 60,000 units per year in the final 
period. 
 Reduction of the fertility rate of 0.22 children per woman in 2060 
 Reduction of life expectancy rate to 2.1 years for men and 2.5 years for women in the 
final period of the estimation 
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 Figure 3.7. Pension expenditures on GDP in the high and low scenarios (%) 
 
 
Source: RGS (2016) 
 
As shown in the figure 3.7, the high scenario assumptions produce a gradual improvement in 
pension expenditure in terms of GDP until 2033. This is mainly due to the reduction of the 
ratio of the number of pensions and number of employed Strengthened by major migratory 
flows and raising the minimum requirements access to retirement linked to life expectancy. In 
the following years instead of pension expenditure started to rise until 2045 and then again to 
decrease. This second phase is justified by the fact that foreigners of migration flows will turn 
into pensioners in this period and the increase in the average age of retirement will result in 
higher pension amounts paid to individuals
117
.  
Similar considerations, but of opposite sign can be made for the low scenario assumptions. 
The effect of this latter scenario on pension expenditure is broadly equivalent indeed, 
although there isn’t a perfect asymmetry in absolute value of the individual demographic 
variables. 
 
The second sensitivity level instead analyses the impact of every single demographic 
component  in the pension expenditures on GDP. However, analyzing the single variable of 
our interest, namely the migration flow, reveals the following conclusions.  
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 Due to the increase of the contributory seniority and the transformation coefficient.  
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Figure 3.8. Pension expenditures on GDP according to different migration flows (%) 
 
 
Source: RGS (2016) 
 
As shown in the figure 3.8, a variation on migration flows has an immediate effect on 
employment and a delayed effect on pensions of about 30-35 years. In particular, in the case 
of a reduction of about 40.000 units per year, it determines a gradual raising of the ratio 
between pension expenditure and GDP generating respect to the national baseline scenarios a 
difference which tends to stabilize around 0.3-0.4 percentage points towards the end of the 
forecast period. Conversely, an increase in migration flows of around 40.000 units per year 
generates a reduction in pension expenditure of about 0.2 percentage points in 2040 and of 
around 0.3 percentage points in 2060 compared with that of the national baseline scenarios.  
As a result is possible to say that an decrease in migration impacts in absolute values 
compared to an increase of the same flows. 
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Figure 3.9. Sensitivity analysis - cumulative differential effect of every demographic and 
macroeconomic components on the national baseline scenario pension expenditures (%) 
 
 
Source: RGS (2016)  
 
Finally, making a brief sensitivity analysis on all the demographic and macroeconomic 
variables taken into consideration, it is possible to observe that the pension expenditure in 
terms of GDP tends to decline especially with a high productivity rate. However, although to 
a lesser extent, a positive impact on reducing pension spending even the hypothesis of a high 
scenario and the hypothesis of a high rate of activity in the labor market. At the individual 
level, the demographic variables do not have a big impact on the reduction of pension 
expenditures, except for the migration variable, which compared to the others seems to have a 
more positive impact. However, as discussed previously, under the best circumstances, 
namely that migration flows should increase to about 40.000 units per year, they generate a 
reduction in pension expenditure of only 0.3 percentage points on GDP in 2060. This result 
therefore contrasts with the claims of some analysts, who argue that the entry of 400-500 net 
migration per year would reduce pension spending
118
. 
There is therefore the need for a policy which aims to strengthen the contribution of 
immigration to the sustainability of state budget and the pension system by raising the levels 
of control in the labor market and reducing inequalities. But also to develop policies to 
increase productivity and social policies to protect every person with very low pension benefit 
or those that in the working life receive low wages. 
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 As well as the potential costs related to the difficulty of integration of so large flows. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this dissertation is to study whether and to what extent immigrants contribute in 
fiscal terms to the State Budget of the country they settle in. Particular attention is paid to 
foreigners’ contribution to the sustainability of the Italian pension system. 
 
At European level, the findings highlighted that the fiscal impact of migration in terms of 
GDP is insignificant, never exceeding, positively or negatively, the 0.5% of national GDP.  
At the Italian level, net contributions of migrant resident population to the State Budget are 
positive and equal to 3.1 billion € and 0.3% of GDP in 2013. 
 
It’s interesting to note that the influence of migrants on the public purse varies according to 
nationality. On the one hand Chinese people contribute the most to the regional budget 
because they declare much higher average incomes than other nationalities. On the other hand  
Moroccan immigrants exercise the worst effect on the regional budget. 
 
As far as the immigrant contribution to the Italian pension system is concerned, in 2014 the 
number of native retirees financed by foreigners was 640.000, considering an average native 
pension income equal to €17.031. 
 
Furthermore, we observe that the so-called “differenziale pensionistico”, meant as the number 
of Italians in retirement age for every immigrant in the same age condition, was 46 to 1 over 
the period 2011-2015, will be 27 to 1 in the time frame 2016-2020 and 19 to 1 over 2021-
2025. These results rely on the assumption that retired foreigners remain in the host country 
for the rest of their lives. However, their permanence is uncertain and some academics have 
developed the following 2 hypotheses: they come back to their home country, maintaining at 
the same time the citizenship of the destination country, thereby benefiting from its social 
assistance; they leave permanently the nation. 
Given immigrants’ very low wages, poverty risk after retirement is very high and this may 
worsen public expenditure.  
 
The sensitivity analysis of Ragioneria Generale dello Stato highlights that a variation on 
migration flows has an immediate effect on employment and a delayed effect on pensions of 
about 30-35 years. In particular, in the case of a reduction of about 40.000 units per year, it 
72 
 
determines a gradual raising of the ratio between pension expenditure and GDP generating 
respect to the national baseline scenarios a difference which tends to stabilize around 0.3-0.4 
percentage points towards the end of the forecast period. Conversely, an increase in migration 
flows of around 40.000 units per year generates a reduction in pension expenditure of about 
0.2 percentage points in 2040 and of around 0.3 percentage points in 2060 compared with that 
of the national baseline scenarios.  
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